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CA9 of the granting of a suppression motion by the D.C. in
cases and the reversal by CA9 of a conviction in the other.

The petition raises the two issues left open in fn. 3 of this
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The Government seeks cert from the affirmance

opinion in United States v. Ortiz, 43 U.S.L.W. 5026.
FACTS:

The Government presented to a United States

District Judge in affidavit form information indicating that
massive violations of the immigration laws were occurring at

-2the INS to maintain the checkpoint and to stop cars carrying
suspected violators in order to make routine inquiries and to
make routine inspections.

The INS did so.

In each of three

cases, the INS asked the car in question to proceed to the

_ . .~--~----------------------------~---------.... and asked each of the occupants
whether they were lawfully in the country. In each case some
..,
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of the occupants responded in the negative and the drivers were
eventually charged with unlawfully smuggling aliens.

Each made

a motion to suppress use of the information obtained by the INS
as a result of the stops and questioning.
were granted; and one denied.
ant was convicted.

Two of the motions

In the latter case the defend-

He appealed in that case and the Government

appealed in the others.

The cases were consolidated and the

lower court's decisions granting the suppression motions were
affirmed by CA9.

The criminal conviction was reversed.

CONTENTIONS:

The Government seeks cert. contending (1)

that a stop may be made at a fixed checkpoint without the
individualized suspicion needed on the open road, see United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 43 U.S.L.W. 5028; and (2) that the
area warrant granted in this case distinguishes the case from
United States v. Ortiz, supra, and Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, and renders the stop in this case valid.
The Government says that whether or not the warrant is really
a warrant in the strict Fourth Amendment sense, it does show
that the difficult balancing involved was made not by law
enforcement officials but by the judiciary.

-3CA9 rejected the notion expressed in Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Almeida-Sanchez that area warrants could
be used at all to detect illegal aliens; and further that the
?robability of finding an alien at the checkpoint--as distinguished from an area near the border--was so small that, even
accepting the area warrant idea, it could not validly apply
here.

The court concluded that the INS stopped less than one

out of 1,000 cars going through the checkpoint and found illegal

U1
2-D 7o

aliens about one out of every five sto?S.

CA9 did not

separately address the question whether a stop may be made
a checkpoint without individualized suspicion.
DISCUSSION:

It is hard to believe that there are still

two border search issues left after last term, but there are and
this case presents them.

The resolution of the question posed

by the first argument advanced by the SG depends upon whether
the Court believes that a stop on the open road can be distinguished from a fixed checkpoint stop once the Court has ruled,
as it has, that a search on the open road cannot be distinguished
from

~

search at a fixed checkpoint.

The resolution of the

question posed by the second argument turns on whether Justice
Powell adheres to his concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez and
whether the four dissenters in Almeida-Sanchez feel that once
Almeida is accepted as precedent, its result cannot rationally
be altered by an area warrant.

It seems to me that the Court

will want to resolve the issues in any event.

-4There is a response.
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Motion of Respondent
for Appointment of Counsel

UNITED STATES

v.
MAR TINEZ-FUER TE
Re sp requests that Charles M. Sevilla, Esq., Chief Trial Attorney of the
Federal Defenders of San Diego, be appointed to represent him in this Court.
On October 6, the Court granted cert to CA 9 to consider two border
search is sues raised by the SG in the instant case and granted re sp leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.

In his affidavit in support of this request, Mr. Sevilla

notes that his office was appointed to represent resp in the DC and has continued
to represent him at all subsequent stages; his office is funded exclusively under
the Criminal Justice Act and is designated by DC order the federal community
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def end e r orga nization for SD Calif. and approved as such by the CA 9 Judicial
C oun cil; and his office represented resps in Ortiz and Brignoni-Ponce.
The r e is no response.
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Chris Whitman

DATE:

April 20, 1976

No. 74-1560 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. United States

This is obviously a field with which you are very
familiar, so my suggestions can be of little help.

My

recommendation,for what its worth, is to affirm 74-1560
and to reverse 75-5387.
This may be contrary to your views.

There are

indications in the opinions you have written that you believe
a stop can be made at a fixed checkpoint without reasonable
suspicion or a warrant, and that a search at either a fixed
checkpoint or by a roving control may be justified by either
probable cause or an area warrant.

I urge that an area warrant

(but not probable cause or reasonable suspicion) be required
for a stop at a fixed checkpoint.
reverse Sifuentes.

For that reason, I would

I would also require that a fixed

checkpoint - '··even one approved by an "area warrant" - have
some rather immediate nexus with the border region.

The San

Clemente checkpoint is, I believe, too remote from the border
to bear scrutiny.

For that reason, I would affirm Martinez-Fuerte.

2.

These cases raise two questions, as the cert memo
points out.

The first question - and the only question raised

by Sifuentes -

is whether a stop-and-inquiry may be made at

a fixed checkpoint without reasonable suspicion, probable cause,
or a warrant of any sort.

If that question is answered in

the affirmative, both cases are disposed of.

If it is answered

in the negative, the Court must go on to decide whether the
procedure is permissible if supported by a search warrant
based on the characteristics of the checkpoint area, rather
than on any specific characteristics of the vehicles or persons
involved.
In Brignoni-Bonce you held that stops by roving patrols
must be supported by reasonable suspicion.

In Ortiz warrantless

searches by roving patrols and searches at fixed checkpoints
were held to be subject to the same standard (probable cause)
because they are equally intrusive.

You indicated that "the

differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint would
be significant in determining the propriety of the stop, which
is considerably less intrusive than a search."
I do not think that the intrusion of a stop-and-inquiry
at a fixed checkpoint is so minimal that safeguards can be
disposed of altogether.

It is true that a stop by a roving

patrol may be more intrusive than a stop at a checkpoint because
of the embarrassment of being chased by a patrol car.

But a

significant intrusion remains - particularly where, as at the

3.

San Clemente checkpoint, only some of the cars are singled out
for inquiry.

I am sure as a practical matter those who appear

to be Mexican are singled out more frequently than others.
(This is unfortunate but, I think, inevitable.)

The annoyance

of being stopped and questioned is not insignificant, especially
to those many travellers who are trying to get someplace fast.
For a citizen who looks Mexican and is detained every time he
passes the checkpoint, the annoyance must reach really frustrating
proportions.

The SG argues that a post hoc evaluation of the

reasonableness of the stop at trial on a motion to suppress
is sufficient.

But much of the damage to the traveling public -

in particular, to the innocent public - is done before any
smugglers or aliens are brought to trial.
On the other side, we are faced with what appears to
be an almost insurmountable law enforcement problem.
alternatives suggested are not convincing.

The

Increasing the

numbers on the border watch will not detect those who use
illegal papers to cross the border.

Subjecting the employers

of aliens to criminal sanctions will discourage the employment
of those legitimately within the country who look like they
might be alien.

I have some qualms about the

~ficacy

of an

area warrant in curbing police discretion, but I am willing to
accept the conclusion that some almost random stops-and-inquiries

4.
are necessary to the effective detection of illegal aliens
and the deterrence of illegal entry.
I do think, however, that the intrusion on the
innocent public described above requires at the least that
the safeguard of an area warrant be used.

It would be a marked

departure from established principles of constitutional law
to authorize stops and inquiries without probable cause,
reasonable suspicion,

£E a warrant.

License checks are carried

on in this way, but they concern regulation of traffic upon
the road (a kind of regulation that the travelling public assumes
when it decides to use the highway) and are not conducive to
any kind of focusing in terms of area or observable characteristics
of the vehicle or the persons in it.

I am not convinced that

the requirement that the Border Patrol get an area warrant will
frustrate law enforcement in a comparable way.

Flexibility,

to the extent that it is needed, can be provided for in the
warrant, or by a series of warrants for various situations.
And a warrant provides at least the possibility of some judicial
oversight of the decisions of the Border Patrol officials and
their operation of the checkpoints.
My qualms about the area warrant is that it is not
responsive to the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity:
" . . . no warrants shall issue but . . . particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."

Your Almeida-Sanchez concurrence posits that a

5.

substitute for "probable cause" can be devised in terms of
an area, but the particularity problem cannot be so easily
handled.

Particularity was present in the warrants permitted

by Camara, for the magistrate was required to focus on whether
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling."

387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).

My fear is

that in the absence of particularity the warrant becomes a
license for the exercise of discretion, rathern than a curb
upon discretion.

An imaginative district court or magistrate

could use the warrant requirement to ensure that the Border
Patrol is acting wisely and with appropriate circumspection,
but, as there are no standards to govern the officers' exercise
of discretion, I fear that the area warrant in reality will
become a mere rubber stamp.
Also, if the area warrant is to have any substance,
the court must at least conduct a thorough inquiry into the
appropriateness of the "area" to be designated by the warrant,
for that is the only check implicit in the concept of an area
warrant.

The checkpoints here are some sixty to ninety miles

from the border.

They are not in the *vast areas of uninhabited

desert and arid land" along the border described in your
Almeida-Sanchez concurrence.

The Border Patrol argues that

these are the most effective points, but surely it cannot be

' '

6.

allowed to pick the most effective
the country.

p~ int

anywhere within

I think some nexus with the border is required.

The stop becomes less intrusive as one approaches the border,
for there is some expectation in the border regions that the
Border Patrol will be conducting operations of this sort.
Chris

. ,.l .

~.

April 26, 1976

No. 74-1560 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S~
The purpose of this memorandum is merely to identify,
for convenient reference, the relevant cases:
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S.

Search by roving patrol, without
warrant or probable cause, held
invalid.

U.S. v. Ortiz

Search at San Clemente checkpoint,
without probable cause or a warrant
of any kind, held invalid in my
opinion last June

U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce

A stop {no search) by a roving
patrol, when the only ground for
suspicion was that the occupants
appeared to be Mexican, was held
invalid.

Bowen v. U.S .

Merely held that Ortiz (invalidating
searches at checkpoints) should not
be applied retroactively. In U.S.
v. Peltier, we also declined to
hold Almeida-Sanchez to be retroactive.

The two cases now before the Court involve issues left
open in the above cases:
74-1560 u.s. v.
Martinez-Fuerte

Presents two issues left open in
footnote 3 of Ortiz, namely: (i)
the validity of a mere stop, and
questioning, at a fixed checkpoint
is valid in the absence of any
individualized suspicion (such as
was held to be required in
Brignoni-Ponce); and (ii) whether,
in any event, the area warrant that
had been granted (pursuant to my
suggestion in Almeida-Sanchez)
validated the stop?

2.
75-5387 Sifuentes
v. u.s.

This presents the same issue raised
in Martine z -Fuerte with respect to
the legality of a warrantless
investigative stop at fixed
immigration checkpoint. There was
no area warrant in this case, and
no individualized suspicion.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss
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No. 74-1560 U.S. v Martinez-Fuerte
No. 75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S.
The purpose of this memo is to identify, for convenient
reference, possible distinctions suggested between stops at
fixed checkpoints, and stops by roving patrols that were
involved in Brignoni-Ponce.
In Brignoni-Ponce we recognize .that Terry v. Ohio had
said that whenever a police officer restrains the freedom
of an individual ''to walk away" he has seized that person.
We also said:
"The reasonableness of such seizures depends
on a balance between the public interest and
the individual's right to personal security,
free from arbitrary interference oy law
officers. Terry at 20-21; Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537.
Against the significant valid public interest in reducing
the flow of illegal aliens into our country, the Court in
Brignoni-Ponce: said:
''. . • We must weigh the interference with
individual liberty that results when an officer
stops an automobile and questions its occupants.
The intrusion is modest. The government tells
us that a stop by roving patrol 'usually consumes
no more than a minute'. ***Because of the
limited nature of the intrusion, stops of this
sort may oe justified on facts that do not amount
to the probable cause required for an arrest."
After discussing Terry and Adams v. Williams, we said:
"In the context of border-area stops, the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment
demands something more than the broad and unlimited

l

I

2.
discretion sought by the government. * * *
To approve roving patrol stops of all vehicles
in the border area, without any suspicion • • •
would subject the residents of these and other
areas to potentially unlimited interference
with their use of the highways • • • . 11
The test approved by Brignoni-Ponce is whether there is
ttreasonable suspicion to justify roving patrolastops".

Where

such suspicion exists, we said:
"The officer may question the driver and passengers
about their citizenship and immigration status, and
he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances,
but any further detention or search must be based on
consent or probable cause".
In justifying allowing a roving patrol stop without
WPobable cause, we said:
". • • ecause of the importance of the
governmental interests at stake, the minimal
intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of
practical alternatives for policing the border,
we hold that when an officer's observation
leads him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may conta4n aliens who are illegally in the
country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate
the circumstances. . . . ''
In United States v. Ortiz (search at a checkpoint),
we noted two differences between fixed checkpoints and roving
patrols that are "relevant to the constitutional issue":
(i) the officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search
"is limited by the location of the checkpoint'', a location
that has been determined by high level border patrol officials
using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to
the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as
the potential for detecting and deterring illegal movement

3. '

of aliens; (ii) "the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint
stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending
a roving patrol stop.

&oving patrols often operate at night

oa seldom traveled roads, and their approach may frighten
mdtorists.

At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that

other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible

s.~

of the officer's authority, and he is much less likely to
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.

* * * Motorists

whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned,
may not be reassured by seeing that the border patrol searches
other cars as well.

Where only a few are singled out for a

search, at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches
especially offensive."

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

!
{
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we noted two differences between fixed checkpoints and roving
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patrols that are "relevant to the constitutional issue":
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(i) the officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search
"is limited by the location of the checkpoint", a location
that has been determined by high level border patrol officials
using criteria that include the degree of inconvenience to
the public and the potential for safe operation, as well as
the potential for detecting and deterring illegal movement
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of aliens; (ii) "the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint
stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending
a roving patrol stop.

Roving patrols often operate at night

on seldom traveled roads, and their approach may frighten
motorists.

At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that

other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs
of the officer's authority, and he is much less likely to
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.

***

Motorists

whose cars are searched, unlike those who are only questioned,
may not be reassured by seeing that the border patrol searches
other cars as well.

Where only a few are singled out for a

search, at San Clemente, motorists may find the searches
especially offensive."

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAM B E R S O F

J USTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR .

June 2, 1976

RE: Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v. MartinezFuerte, et al. and Sifuentes v. United States

Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.ittpTttttt Q}~ud of tqt 'J{ttittlt

;itattg

Jfagfri:ttgbm. ~. (!}. 2LT.;t'l-~

/

C HA MBERS OF

..JUS T ICE POTTER STEWART

June 2, 1976

Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387
U. S. v. Martinez-Fuerte
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in these cases.
Sincerely yours,

Mr . Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~tqtrtmt <!Jo:ttrl o:f tift ~it~ ~hdtl¥
'~lhudrittghm. !}.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 2, 1976
Re:

74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v.
Amado Martinez-Fuerte, et al.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

I
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 4, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1560 & 75-5387 -United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte

Dear Lewis:
I give up.

Join me, at least for now.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to Conference
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 4, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte

Dear Lewis:
I intend to join your opinion.

I offer two suggestions.

In order to suggest some guidelines for the proposition,
at page 16, that choice of location (and method of operation,
at pages 21-22) of the permanent checkpoints will be subject
to "post-stop judicial review," I would like the opinion to
indicate that the reviewing court should pass on any claim
of arbitrariness in the context of the officials' acting
) pursuant to statutory and regulatory authority, and to
suggest that if the choice is within those limits, it is
entitled at least prima facie to a presumption of reasonableness.
Hence, the following suggestion for the first full sentence
at page 16:
"Moreover, any claim that a particular exercise
of discretion by these official& in locating
or operating a permanent checkpoint, is arbitrary
or irrational under applicable statutes and
regulations 12a may be considered in a poststop judicial review."
As to the language refuting any claim that a warrant
is necessary, last sentence starting on page 21, I would

12a/

See n. 8, supra.
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suggest, if consistent with your intent, a cross-reference
generally to the above.

Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 4, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte

Dear Lewis:
I intend to join your opinion.

I offer two suggestions.

In order to suggest some guidelines for the proposition,
at page 16, that choice of location; (and method of operation,
at pages 21-22) of the permanent ~heckpoints will be subject
to "post-stop judicial review," I would like the opinion to
indicate that the reviewing court should pass on any claim
of arbitrariness in the context of · tlie officials' acting
pursuant to statutory and regulato~y authority, and to
suggest that if the choice is within those limits, it is
entitled at least prima facie to a presumption of reasonableness.
Hence, the following suggestion for the first full sentence
at page 16:
"Moreover, any claim that a particular exercise
of discre_tion by these official& in locating
or operating a permanent checkpoint, is arbitrary
or irrational under applicable statutes and
regulations 12a may be considered in a poststop judicial review."
As to the language refuting any claim that a warrant
is necessary, last sentence starting on page 21, I would

12a/

See n. 8, supra.

- 2 suggest, if consistent with your intent, a cross-reference
generally to the above.

Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 8, 1976

Re:

Nos. 74-1560 and 75-5387 - United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely, ~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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No. 74-1560 and 75·5387
Martinez-Fuerte
Dear Bill:
'Thank 'you for your letter. i am glad to try to make '
clearer how the opinion responds to your concern, which I
share, that wiae discretion must oe left to the Border
Patrol. I am reluctant, however, to use the phrase
"arbitrary or irrational." This is something of a term
of art in light of its use• elsewhere in the law. It is
best, ·I think, to stick with the Fourth Amendment's standard
of "reasonableness". I therefore propose the following for
the first full sentence on page 16:
"Moreover a claim that a particular exercise of
; discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint.
is unref~onable is subject to post-stop judicial
review. a
,
12a. The choice of checkpoint locations must
be left largely to the discretion of Border Patrol
officials to be exercised in accordance with statutes
and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15,
infra. Many ~ncidents of checKpoint operation also
must be committed to the discretion of the officials
in charge. But see infra at 22."
I would insert on page 22 a cross
passage.
Sincerely,

Mr . Justice Rebnquist
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I am glad to try to
opwion
your concern, wnich I snare, t.hat wide discretion must
left to t.:he .Border Patrol. I am reluctant, however, to use
your proposed t>nrase "aroitrary or irr Lional. It Toe l)hraae ,, r
is something uf a term of arL: in ligh1.. of its use elsewhere ,
1.n the ·l aw, and I oelieve that it is best to stic~ with the ·:.,
,. Fourth 'Amendment 1 s own standard of "reasonaoaeness''. I
• therefore propose the following for the first full sentence
at pa~e ··~l6: ·.
· ·
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·uj.'J oreover a claim tha1.. a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a cneckpoint
;:v~:!~f~~nable ~s subject to, post-stop judicial
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12a·:· The choice of checkpoint: locations must ·
be left' largely to the discretion of 6order Patrol
officials to be exercised in accordance with statutes
and regulations tnat may be applicable. See n. 15,
infra. ·Many J..ncidents of cnec.t.tl,)oinc operation also
must be coDillitteo to the discretion of such officials •.
But see infra at 22. 11
inserting on page 22 a

•
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 10, 1976

Re: (74-1560 -United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
(75-5387 -Sifuentes v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I join your proposed opinion.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

June

No. 74-1560 - United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
No. 75-5387 - Sifuentes v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

14,7

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

June 16, 197 6

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 74-1560 --United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

19, n. 6: . Substitute for

'C
F .1'1

beginning on the
'llf;

•
whereas American citizens of Mexican
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute
a significantly larger proportion of the population of
,,
Southern California. The 1970 census figures, which may
not fully reflect illegal aliens 1 show the population of '~~~"
California to be approxtmately 1~,953,000
of whom some
2,447 ,000, or 12%, are of Spanish or Mexican ancestry. , , ,
The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and :t
Los Angeles are 11% and 15~ respectively. If the statewide
population ratio is applied to the approximately 146,000
vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during .
the eight days surrounding the arrests in No. 74-1560,
, ~.,
roughly 17,500 would be expected to contain persons of
'
Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to
the secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion r,
that the Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent
Mexican ancestry standing alone in referring motorists · to., ,
the secondary area.
.

'.&'

,.,

~

of
Part VI, insert the following (note ~ l9)~
-~"···,!;;~. "'
··""' ' ~
,.,
19. Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
reflects unwarranted concern in suggesting that today's
decision marks a radical new intrusion on citizens'
It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth Amendment
.~.·- . ~.~,
protections", and states that the Court "virtually empties ;,.,:
the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post, ,, ~·-·
at 1, 2.
Since 1946, Act of Aug. 7, 1946, 60 Stat-:-8'6'5,' ·,
Congress has expressly authorized persons believed to be
aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles
"within a reasonable distance" from the border to be
searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra.
The San Clemente . )
checkpoint has been operating at its present location
·~·
throughout the intervening 30 years. Our prior cases hav.e
limited significantly the reach of this Congressional
,
authorization, requiring probable cause for any vehicle
.
search in the interior and reasonable suspicion for inquiry
stops by roving patrols. See supra at 11-12.
Our holding
today, approving routine stops £or brief questioning (a
type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that
.
neither longstanding Congressional authorization nor widely
prevailing practices justify a Constitutional violation.
·
We do suggest, however, that against this background and
,/'
in the context of our recent decisions, the rhetoric of
the dissent , reflects unjustified concern.
.,. , ,, ·
.~
,~ '':
,~ , The dissenting opinion also asserts that "the
stovped vehicles and their occuvants are. certainly subjected
to search' as well as 'seizure ". Post, at 4. This
is indeed novel doctrine.
As early-as-United States v. Lee,
274 u.s. 559, 563 (1927), Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking £or
a unan~ous Court, held that a visual inspection of a ship
aided by a searchlight was not a aearch within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. If such an inspection of a vessel
is not a "search", one hardly would think that .~.looking through
the windows of an automobile constituted a search. The
more pertinent question is whether the enforcement agent
'<
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$

~,,

llhl.
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.;'

,,

3.

has a right to be in the vantage point from which
he makes his observation, as he does here because of
his authority to make an inquiry stop. Moreover, in
:
Brignoni-Ponce, an opinion joined by Mr. Justice Brennan;
we made clear that a stop for questioning involves "no
search of the vehicle or its occupants". 422 U.S., at 880.
The dissenting opinion further warns:
"Every American citizen of Mexican
ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully
in this country must know after today's "
decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk • • • • "
,,

~

~.·

'1

~·

'

.

~

at 6. ~/· For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, thi~.
concern is misplaced. Moreover, upon a proper showing, )'
courts would not be powerless to prevent the misuse of
checkpoints, to harass those of Mexican ancestry.
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f"JLE COPY

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 23, 1976

PLEASE RETURN
TO FILE

Holds for Nos. 74-1560 U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte and
75-5387 Sifuentes v. U.S.
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
No. 75-6112

Hart v. United States (heretofore Held for
the Border Search cases).

This petition for certiorari presents two unrelated
cases. Both involve marijuana convictions in federal court.
The marijuana was uncovered during two different searches
conducted at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint. The convictions
were affired by CA 5, came here last Term, and were vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Ortiz and
Brignoni-Ponce.
CA 5 again affirmed in both cases.
The case of petitioners Dixon, Bylund, and Arnold
presents no issue of interest. They concede that their
convictions are valid if routine checkpoint stops are
permissible. Martinez-Fuerte and Sifuentes thus control
their case.
Petitioner Hart's case presents a more substantial
question. Hart was subjected to a routine search at the
checkpoint. CA 5 has upheld his conviction on the ground
that the Sierra Blanca checkpoint is the "functional
equivalent" of the Border. I said in Last Term's Hold
memo that, as the checkpoint is 20 miles from the border on an Interstate Highway, I doubt that it meets the CA 9
standard for "functional equivalency."
That standard

2.
requires a reasonable certainty that most cars passing
the checkpoint will have come from the Border. See United
States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960, 965-966 (CA 9 1974).
On remand CA 5 said nothing to change this view.
I therefore think the case was wrongly decided. But it has
been here twice and twice reviewed by CA 5. I'm not
inclined to take another "Border Patrol" case at this time.
I will vote to Deny.

t_ ~~~ rP.
L.F.P.,Jr.

To: The
Mr .
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

e!:

1st DRAFT

~UPREME

From: Mr. Justice Brennan
Circulated: _________
R ~irculated: --.::........,-....-.-/

COURT OF THE UNITED STATE&
Nos. 74-1560
\)

l
l

AND

75-5387

Vnited States, Petitioner,
On Writ. of Certiorari tq
74-1560 ·
v~ ·
the Umted States C~urt.
.
d M t'
F
of Appeals for the F1fth
Arna o ar mez- uerte eta.
1
c·
't
· .
· ·
lrCUl •
Rodolfo Sifuenws Petitioner On Writ of Certiorari tq
75-5387
v. · -'
'
the United States Court
·
U 'ted ·S
of Appeals for the
m
tates.
N'm th c·1rcm.
't
[June -, 1976]
MR JusTIC~ BRENNA~,

with whom MR. JusTICE MAR.,
joins, dissenting.
Today's decision is the ninth this Term marking the
continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Early
in the Term, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976), permitted the search of an automobile in police custody without first obtaining a warrant despite the unreasonableness of the custody and opportunity to obtain a warrant.
United States v. Watson, U. S. (1976), held
that regardless whether opportunity exists to obtain a
warrant is never required to make an arrest in a public
place for a previously committed felony, a result certainly not fairly supported by either history or precedent.
See id. , at (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
United
U. S. ( 1976) , went further
States v. Santana, and approved the warrantless arrest for a felony of a person standing on the front porch of her residence. United
U. S. (1976) , narrowed the
States v Miller, Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy by denying
the existence of a protectible interest in the compila--

!'HALL

Chief' Justice
.Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
.Tustice Powell
,Tustice R >hn.q'list
Justice Stevens
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tion of checks, deposit slips, and other records pertaining:
to an individual's bank account. Stone v. Powell, (1976)', precluded the assertion of Fourth
U. S. Amendment claims in federal collateral relief proceedings.
United States v. Janis,- U. S . - (1976), held that
evidence unconstitutionally seized by a state officer is
admissible in a civil proceeding by or against the United
States. South Dakota v. Opperman, U. S. ( 1976), approved inventory searches of automobiles in
police custody. Finally, in Andresen v. Maryland,
U. S. ( 1976), the Court, in practical effect, weakened
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against general
warrants.
Consistently with this purpose to debilitate Fourth
Amendment protections, the Court's decision today virtually empties the Amendment of its reasonableness
requirement by holding that law enforcement officials
manning fixed checkpoint stations who make standardless seizures of persons do not violate the Amendment.
This holding cannot be squared with this Court's recent
decisions in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 872 (1975);
and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266( 1973). I dissent.
While the requisite justification for permitting a
search or seizure may vary in certain contexts, compare
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 ( 1964), with Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968), and Carrnara v. Municipal Court,
387 U. S. 523 ( 1967), even in the exceptional situations
permitting intrusions on less than probable cause, it has
long been settled that justification must be measured by
objective standards. Thus in the seminal decision justifying intrusions on less than probable cause, Terry v.
Ohio, supra, the Court said:
"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes

74-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT
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meaningful only when it is assured that at some
point the conduct of those charged with enforcing
the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts,
be judged a.gainst an objective standard . . . . Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this
Court has consistently refused to sanction." Terry
v. Ohio, supra, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
"This demand for specificity in the information
upon which police action is predicated is the central
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." I d., at 21 n. 18.

Terry thus made clear what commonsense teaches: con-~
duct, to be reasonable, must pass muster under objective
standards applied to specific facts.
We are told today, however, that motorists without
number may be individually stopped, questioned, visually inspected, and then further detained without even
a showing of articulable suspicion, see ante, at 3, let
alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of reasonable suspicion, a result that permits search and seizure
to rest upon "nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches." This defacement of Fourth Amendment protections is arrived at by a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection against unwarranted
official intrusion by a governmental interest said to
justify the search and seizure. But that method is only
a convenient cover for condoning arbitrary official conduct, for the governmental interests relied on as warranting intrusion he~ are the same a& thoJ:ie in Almeida-

(4-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT
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Sanchez and Ortiz, which required a showing of probable
cause for roving-patrol and fixed checkpoint searches,
and Brignoni-Ponce, which required at least a showing of reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable
facts to justify roving-patrol stops. Absent some difference in the nature of the intrusion, the same minimal requirement should be imposed for checkpoint stops.
The Court assumes, and I certainly agree, that persons
stopped at fixed checkpoints, whether or not referred to
a secondary detention area, are "seizedn within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, since the
the vehicle and its occupants are subjected to a "visual
inspection," the intrusion clearly exceeds mere physical
restraint, for officers a.r e able to see more in a stopped
vehicle than in vehicles traveling at normal speeds down
the highway. As the Court concedes, ante, at 14, the
checkpoint stop involves essentially ""Th.e same intrusions
as a roving-patrol stop, yet the Court provides on principled basis for distinguishing checkpoint stops.
Certainly that basis is not provided in the Court's
reasoning that the subjective intrusion here is appreciably less than in the case of a stop by a roving patrol.
Brignoni-Ponce nowhere bases the requirement of reasonable suspicion upon the subjective nature of the intrusion. In any event, the subjective aspects of checkpoint stops, even if different from the subjective aspects
of roving-patrol . stops, just as much require some principled restraint on law enforcement conduct. The motorist whose conduct has been nothing but innocent-and this is overwhelmingly the case-surely resents his
own detention and inspection. And checkpoints, unlike
roving stops, retain thousands of motorists, a dragnetlike procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citizens. Also, the delay occasioned by stopping hundreds
of vehicles on a busy highway is particularly irritating.

'14-1560 & 75-5387-DISSENT
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In addition to overlooking these dimensions of sub~
jective intrusion, the Court, without explanation, also
ignores one major source of vexation. In abandoning
any requirement of a minimum of reasonable suspicion,
or even articulable suspicion, the Court in every practical sense renders meaningless, as applied to checkpoint
stops, the Brignoni-Ponce holding that "standing alone
[Mexican appearance] does not justify stopping all
Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens." 1 422
U. S., at 887. Since the objective is almost entirely the
Mexican illegally in the country, checkpoint officials, uninhibited by any objective standards and therefore free
to stop any or all motorists without explanation or excuse, wholly on whim, will perforce target motorists of
Mexican appearance. The process will then inescapably
discriminate against citizens of Mexican ancestry and
Brignoni-Ponce, which involved roving-patrol stops, said:
"[Mexican ancestry] alone would justify neither a reasonable belief
that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed
pther aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of
native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area
a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it
does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are
aliens." 422 U.S., at 886-887.
Today we are told that secondary referrals may be based on criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, and specifically
that such referrals may be based largely on Mexican ancestry.
Ante, at 19. Even if the difference between Brignoni-Ponce and this
decision is only a matter of degree, we are not told what justifies the
different treatment of Mexican appearance or why greater emphasis
is permitted in the less demanding circumstances of a checkpoint.
That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as
probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any
1

circumstance~!,
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Mexican aliens lawfully in this country for no other reason than that they unavoidably possess the same "suspicious" physical and grooming characteristics of illegal
Mexican aliens.
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every
Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after
today's decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop,
but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged
and to an extent far more than non-Mexican appearing
motorists. To be singled out for referral and to be detained
and interrogated must be upsetting to any motorist. One
wonders what actual experience supports my Brethren's
conclusion that referrals "should not be frightening or
offensive because of their public and relatively routine
nature." Ante, at 16. 2 In point of fact, referrals, viewed
in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are
permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected motorists who must suffer the delay and humiliation of
detention and interrogation, the experience can obviously
be upsetting. 8 And that experience is particularly vex-l
2 The Court's view that "selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants of every car-tend to advance some Fourth
Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public," ante, at 16, stands the Fourth Amendment on its
head. The starting point of this view is the unannounced assumption that intrusions are generally permissible; hence, any minimization of intrusions serves Fourth Amendment interests. Under the
Fourth Amendment, however, the status quo is nonintrusion, for as
a general matter, it is unreasonable to subject the average cit1zen or
his property to search or seizure. Thus, minimization of intrusion
only lessens the aggravation to Fourth Amendment interests; 1t certainly does not further those interests.
8 Ortiz expressly recognized that such selectivity is a source of
embarrassment. "Nor do checkpoint procedures significantly reduce the likelihood of embarrassment. Motorists whose cars are·
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ing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selec~ \
tively referred, knowing that the officers' target is the
Mexican alien. That deep resentment will be stirred
by a sense of unfair discrimination is not difficult
foresee. 4
In short, if a balancing process is required, the balance
should be struck, as in Brignoni-Ponce, to require that
border patrol officers act upon at least reasonable suspisearched, unlike those who are only questioned, may not be reassured by seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as,
well." 422 U. S., at 895.
1 Though today's decision would clearly permit detentions to be·
based solely on Mexican ancestry, the Court takes comfort in what
appears to be the Border Patrol practice of not relying on Mexican
ancestry standing alone in referring motorists for secondary detentions. Ante, at 19 n. 16. See also id., at 22 n. 19. Good faith
on the part of law enforcement officials, however, has never sufficed in this tribunal to substitute as a safeguard for personal freedoms or to remit our duty to effectuate constitutional guarantees.
Indeed, with particular regard to the Fourth Amendment, Terry v.
Ohio, supra, at 22, held that "simple '"good faith on the part of the
arresting officer is not enough." . . . If subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects," only in the discretion of the police.' Beck v.
Ohio, supra, at 97 ."
Even if good faith is assumed, the affront to the dignity of Mexican citizens and Mexican aliens lawfully within the country is in no
way diminished. The fact still remains that people of their ancestry
are targeted for examination at checkpoints and that the burden of
checkpoint intrusions will lie heaviest on them. That, as the Court
observes, ante, at 19 n. 16, "[I] ess than 1% of the motorists passing
the checkpoint are stopped for questioning," whereas approximately
12% of the population of Cailfornia is of Spanish or Mexican
ancestry, has little bearing on this point-or, for that matter, on
the integrity of Border Patrol practices. There is no indication
how many of the 12% have physcial and grooming characteristics
identifiable as Mexican. There is no indication what portion of the
motoring public in California is of Spanish or Mexican ancestry.
Given the socioeconomic status of this portion, it is. likely that the-
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cion in making checkpoint stops. In any event, even if
a different balance were struck, the Court cannot, without ignoring the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness, justify wholly unguided seizures by officials
manning the checkpoints. The Court argues, however,
that practicalities necessitate otherwise: "A requirement
that stops on major routes inland always be based on
reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the
flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would allow it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens." Ante, at
13.
As an initial matter, whatever force this argument
may have, it cannot apply to the secondary detentions
that occurred in No. 74-1560. Once a vehicle has been
slowed and observed at a checkpoint, ample opportunity
exists to formulate the reasonable suspicion which, if it
actually exists, would justify further detention. Indeed,
though permitting roving stops based on reasonable suspicion, Brignoni-Ponce required that "any further detention or search must be based on [the greater showing of]
consent or probable cause." 422 U. S., at 882. The
Court today, however, does not impose a requirement
of even reasonable suspicion for these secondary stops.
The Court's rationale is also not persuasive in that
several of the factors upon which officers may rely in
establishing reasonable suspicion are readily ascertainable, regardless of the flow of traffic. For example, with
checkpoint stops like with roving-patrol stops, where
figure is significantly less than 12% . Neither is there any indication that those of Mexican ancestry are not subjected to lengthier
initial stops than others, even if they are not secondarily detained .
Finally, there is no indication of the ancestral makeup of the 1%
who are referred for secondary detention . If, as is quite likely the
case, it is overwhelmingly Mexican, the sense of discrimination
which will be felt is only enhanced.

I
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officers initially deal with a vehicle traveling, not at a
crawl, but at highway speeds, " [a] spects of the vehicle
itself may justify suspicion." United States v. Brignoni- (
Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885. Thus it is relevant that the
vehicle is a certain type of station wagon, appears to be
heavily loaded, contains an extraordinary number of persons, or contains persons trying to hide. See ibid. If
such factors are . satisfactory to permit the imposition
of a reasonable suspicion requirement in the more demanding circumstances of a roving patrol, they clearly
should suffice in the circumstances of a checkpoint stop.
Finally, the Court's argument fails for more basic
reasons. There is no principle in the jurisprudence of
fundamental rights which permits constitutional limitations to be dispensed with merely because they cannot
be conveniently satisfied. Dispensing with reasonable
suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping and inspecting
motorists because the inconvenience of such a requirement would make it impossible to identify a given car
as a possible carrier of aliens is no more justifiable than
dispensing with probable cause as prerequisite to the
search of an individual because the inconvenience of
such a requirement would make it impossible to identify
a given person in a high-crime area as a possible carrier
of concealed weapons. "The needs of law enforcement
stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official
power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional
safeguards." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra,
at 273.
The Court also attempts to justify its approval of
standardless conduct on the ground that checkpoint stops
"involve less discretionary enforcement activity" than
roving stops. Ante, at 15, This view at odds with its
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later more revealing statement that "officers must have
wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted
for the brief questioning involved." Id., at 20. Similarly unpersuasive is the statement that "since field offi~
cers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint,
there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of in~
dividuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol
stops." Id., at 15-16. 5 The Fourth Amendment stand~
ard of reasonableness admits of neither intrusion at the
discretion of law enforcement personnel nor abusive or
harassing stops, however infrequent. Action based
merely on whatever may pique the curiosity of a particular officer is the antithesis of the objective standards
requisite to reasonable conduct and to avoiding abuse l
and harassment. Such action, which the Court now
permits, has expressly been condemned as contrary to
basic Fourth Amendment principles. Certainly today's
holding is far removed from the proposition emphatically affirmed in United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972), that "those charged
with ... investigative and prosecutorial duty should not
5 As an empirical proposition, this observation is hardly selfevident. No small number of vehicles pass through a checkpoint.
Indeed, better than 1,000 pass through the San Clemente checkpoint during each hour of operation. Ante, at 10. Thus there is
clearly abundant opportunity for abuse and harassment at checkpoints through lengthier detention and questioning of some individuals or arbitrary secondary detentions. Such practices need not be
confined to those of Mexican ancestry. And given that it is easier
to deal with a vehicle which has already been slowed than it is
to observe and then chase and apprehend a vehicle travelling at
highway speeds, if anything, there is more, not less, room for abuse
or harassment at checkpoints. Indeed, in Ortiz, the Court was "not
persuaded that the checkpoint limits to any meaningful extent the
officer's discretion to select cars for search." 422 U. S., at 895. A
fortiori, discretion can be no more limited simply because the activity is detention or questioning rather than searching.

I
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be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally
sensitive means of pursuing their tasks. The historical
judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that
unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook
potential invasions of privacy ...." Indeed, it is far
removed from the even more recent affirmation that "the
central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials." United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 895. 6
The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free
society, is orderly procedure. The Constitution, as
originally adopted, was therefore, in great measure, a
procedural document. For the same reasons the drafters
of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in procedural limitations on government action. The Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be
reasonable enforces this fundamental understanding in
erecting its buffer against the arbitrary treatment of citizens by government. But to permit, as the Court does
today, police discretion to supplant the objectivity of reaCamara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), does not
support the Court's result. Contrary to the Court's characterization, ante, at 17, the searches condoned there were not "random
intrusions." The Court required that administrative searches proceed according to reasonable standards satisfied with respect to
each particular dwelling searched. 387 U. S., at 538. The search
of any dwelling at the whim of administrative personnel was not
permitted. The Court, however, imposes no such standards today,
Instead, any vehicle and its passengers are subject to detention at
a fixed checkpoint, and "no particularized reason need exist to
justify" the detention. Ante, at 19. To paraphrase an apposite
observation by the Court in Almeida-Sanchez, "[checkpoints] thus
embody precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted
that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed ...."
413 U. S., at 270.
6
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son and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place of
order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards
and threaten erosion of the cornerstone of our system
of a government, for as Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded us, "The history of American freedom is, in no·
small measure, the history of procedure." Malinski Vr
New York, 324 U.S. 401,414 (1945).
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I have the opinion for the Court in these two cases
which present the same issue.
The problem arises from the

alien~ho

enter the

United States illegally, primarily from Mexico.
with Mexico is almost 2,000 miles long.

The border

There are several

million aliens/ illegally in the country,j most of whom
crossed the Mexican border surreptitiously.

They avoid

lawful ports of entry;~cross on foot at various points;j and
rendezvous with smugglers, j who transport them inland.
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland traffic~
checking operations:

roving patrols, temporary checkpoints,

and permanently located checkpoints.
The stopping for questioning,;'and sometimes s earching, /
of vehicles suspected of transporting aliensj'has produced
hundreds of litigated cases, especially in the federal
courts of Texas and California.

These cases, several of

which hav e come to us in recent years, often present
di fficult Fourth Amendment issues.
We are concerned today~with the operation of two
- triU.. ""'-' CI..L.l- ""- ~ ~ T ~~·
permanent checkpointsA f he defendants in these cases were
stopped for questioning, and aliens were found in both
vehicles.

2.

The issue presentedJ'is whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against "searches and seizures"/ was violated
by routine checkpoint stops of vehiclesJ'on a public
for questioning of occupants.

highwa~

These stops are made where

there is neither probable cause/ nor any reasonable suspicion
for believing the vehicle contained illegal aliens.
At the San Clemente checkpoint, involved in one of
these cases, during an eight-day period in 1974, some
146,000 vehicles passed the checkpoint.

All were slowed to

a few miles per hourJ'f or a fleeting visual inspection.

820

vehicles were selectedJ'nd referred to a secondary areaJ'for
routine questions as to citizenship.

Of the 820 vehicles,

171 were found to be transporting a total of 725 deportable
aliens.

The questioning usually takes not more than 3 to 5

minutes.
The

~opping

of motorists on highwaysJ'f or various

inquiries - license checks, weight-limit inspections, fruit
and vegetable inspections, and the like - is familiar to all
motorists.
We hold that stops for brief questioning,j'routinely
conducted at an official

checkpoint, ~re

with the Fourth Amendment.

wholly consistent

The intrusion on privacy, and the
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of vehicles suspected of transporting aliens has produced
hundreds of litigated cases, especially in the federal
courts of Texas and California.

These cases, several of

which have come to us in recent years, often present
difficult Fourth Amendment issues.
We are concerned today with the operation of two
permanent checkpoints.

The defendants in these cases were

stopped for questioning, and aliens were found in both
vehicles.

2.

The issue presented is whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against "searches and seizures" was violated
by routine checkpoint stops of vehicles on a public highway,
for questioning of occupants.

These stops are made where

there is neither probable cause nor any reasonable suspicion
for believing the vehicle contained illegal aliens.
At the San Clemente checkpoint, involved in one of
these cases, during an eight-day period in 1974, some
146,000 vehicles passed the checkpoint.

All were slowed to

a few miles per hour for a fleeting visual inspection.

820

vehicles were selected and referred to a secondary area for
routine questions as to citizenship.

Of the 820 vehicles,

171 were found to be transporting a total of 725 deportable
aliens.

The questioning usually takes not more than 3 to 5

minutes.
Theocopping of motorists on highways for various
inquiries - license checks, weight-limit inspections, fruit
and vegetable inspections, and the like - is familiar to all
motorists.
We hold that stops for brief questioning, routinely
conducted at an official checkpoint, are wholly consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.

The intrusion on privacy, and the

3.
limitation on freedom of movement, are minimal.

The

public interest, and the need for this modest enforcement
technique, have been demonstrated abundantly by the records
before us.

****
Accordingly, we reverse No. 74-1560, here from the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and affirm 75-5387,
here from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

****
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Marshall concurs.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and affirm 75-5387,
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limitation on freedom of movement, ( are minimal.

The

public interest,j and the need for this modest enforcement
technique,( have been demonstrated abundantly by the records
before us.

Accordingly, we reverse No. 74-1560 , here from the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and affirm 75-5387,
here from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Marshall concurs.

To:
From:
Re:

Mr. Putzel
Chambers of Justice Powell
Lineup for Martinez-Fuerte, No. 74-1560

Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rhenquist, and Stevens,
JJ., joined.

Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which

Marshall, J., joined.
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pants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and th~~ and questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints
in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the particular
vehicle contains illegal aliens. Pp. 12-20.
(a) To require that such stops always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic
tends to be too heavy to allow tho particularized study of a
given car necessary to identify it as a possible carrier of illegal
aliens. Such a requirement also would largely eliminate any
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations,
even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
Pp. 12-14.
(b) While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests
is quite limited, the interference with legitimate traffic being
minimal and checkpoint operations involving less discretionary
enforcement activity than roving-patrol stops. Pp. 14-16.
(c) Under the circumstances of these checkpoint stops, which
do not involve searches, the Government or public interest in
making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. Pp. 16-18.
(d) With respect to the checkpoint involved in No. 74-1560,
it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to a secondary

·X·Together with No. 75-5387, Sifuentes v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit .
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The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search a.nd
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528 (1967).
In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 ( 1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
a search could be conducted without consent only if there
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283--285 (PowELL,
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
appropnately are~ct to less stnngent constitutional
safeguards. The question was under what circumstances
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effectively at the border. We note here only the sub- /~
stantiality of the public interest '{n the practice of routine JIA" ~
stoRS for inqmry at permanent checkpoints, a practice
which the Government identifies as the most important
of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the United
States in No. 74-1560 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend
many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the
lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland ( ~
11
always be based on reasonable suspicio'ii" would be
k-impract,ical becaus~ the frow of traffic tends to be too
he~ to-allow the particularized study of a given car
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
12
The defendant':l argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by
means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually
all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments
tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The
defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols not defeated
by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra, at 13-14.
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 0 we(_ perceive~ no~
~'
~.
J'""'Z-d'..
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 16; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border. Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are. furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens
regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was
selected as the location where traffic is lightest between San Diego
and Los Angeles, thereby minimizing interference with legitimate
traffic.
l\o question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 755387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. 8., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
whereas American citizens of :.iexican ancestry and legally resident
:.iexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the
population of Southern California. The 1970 census figures, which
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, or 16%,
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, vol. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in
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MARTINEZ AND SIFUENTES
Outline of May 10 Draft Opinion
The purpose of dictating this outline is to assist
in giving me an "overview" of the entire draft.

My

impression from a first reading is that (i) there is a
substantial amount of repetition, both of facts and
reasoning; (ii) there may be some unnecessary arguments
advanced; and (iii) as is often the case with a first
draft, the writing itself lacks the degree of conciseness
are
and unity thatxaxa desirable.
I.

A.
The facts are stated in No. 75·1560 (pp. 1-6)

B.
The facts are stated in No. 75-5387 (pp. 6·8)
Comment:
The facts are well stated.

I doubt that much is

to be gained by trying to condense them.

2.
II.
This part (pp. 9-15) describes the overall problem
very well, and properly focuses primarily on the Mexican
alien.

There is also a

summary (p. 14) of the statistics

with respect to the San Clemente checkpoint.
This Part II is a useful background for the rest of
the opinion.

I believe, however, that subsequent portions

of the opinion repeat to some extent - perhaps more than
necessary - information in Part II.

This impression needs

to be verified.

III.

A.
Subpart A (p. 15-18) is a relatively simplistic
summary of Fourth Amendment principles.

As these have

been summarized many times in our cases, I am not sure
that a recapitulation here is either necessary or desirable.
The more relevant Fourth Amendment cases are cited or
discussed in subsequent portions of the draft.

!

3.

B.
This contains a summary of prior border patrol cases
decided recently by the Court.

Again, this may be useful

although it results in some later repetition.

As I dictate

this, I am inclined to think Subpart A (general discussion
of elementary Fourth Amendment principles) could be omitted,
accompanied by some modest revision - referring to the
general principles - of Subpart B.

IV
This purports to set the framework for a

11

balancing"

or .. weighing" of the competing pxim private and public
interests involved.
Subpart A (p. 21-22)

correc~and persuasively
/\..

concludes that the intrusion or interferxence with
the right of free passage is

"/U.t

Vv-

min~al. ~~~es

not

~1~

require much weigh on theG other side of the scales to
1
t
counterbalance the limited personal interest.

Yet,

Subpart B (p. 23-25) presents the public interest very
well and perhaps more fully than is required in light

f

4.
of what has been said above in Part II.

Nevertheless,

I did not commence to feel that the opinion was becoming
unnecessarily prolix until after I moved beyond Subpart B.
I particularly like what is said on page 24.

c.
This subpart gives me some difficulty.

It addresses

the defendant's argument that at least there should be
reasonable suspicion at a checkpoint of the type described
in Brignoni•Ponce as necessary for a roving patrol stop.

..

\

It seems to me that the draft already has virtually disposed
of this argument in Subpart A of Part IV.
consolidation of

11.

Subparts A and C.

I suggest a

Such a revision might

identify the defendant's contention early in the discussion.
The defendant, in light of Brignoni-Ponce does not contend
that probable cause is necessary but only reasonable
suspicion.

Thus, we need to meet this argument by

emphasizing the distinction between the roving patrol
and the fixed checkpoint stops, concluding that the

.

,.

5.

tatatx.dt individual's interest - the degree of intrusion is less in the latter type stop.

At that point, the

competing interests of the public in the apaa operation
of the fixed checkpoints can be presented.

Pc~l---

Subparagfaph D (pp. i i 31·33) addresses the argument
made in the San Clemente case that pulling motorists off
to a secondary area is a significant added intrusion.
This. argument certainly must be met but it seems to me
that the draft YlntBZxaan "overreacts" to it.

At the

outset of the opinion, the operation of the San Clemente
checkpoint-

with~e

secondary area and the total delay

of only three to five minutes - have been discussed.

The

entire analysis with respect to a nstop", including the
distinguishing of Brignoni-Ponce, applies to the entire
"stop and questioning" operation at San Clemente.

I think

we can recognize, perhaps in a single paragraph, that there
is a difference in degree between a stop on the main
highway, followed by limited questions, and the singling

1!

f

l'

6.

out of a vehicle for movement to the secondary area.
But. as the draft notes, there is a legitimate reason volume of traffic - for this different type of treatment.
It may require a somewhat longer delay of the traveler
but the substance of the intrusion is the same:

it is

limited to a stop for a particularized purpose, namely,
the identification of the occupants.

This occurs, even

at San Clemente, as a routine operation in the presence
of several officers and on a regularized basis.

There

is, of course, no search.
In short, I would not overdignify this particular

argument of the Martinez defendants.

v
This brief part (p. 34-36) meets Sifuentes' argument
'\

that a warrant is required to authorize routine stops
at a checkpoint.

As we ka8 have already held, in the

preceding parts of the opinion, that neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion is required for a checkpoint
stop, I would have thought we could have disposed of this

7.
Sifuentes argument in suiiJllary fashion.

To be sure, the

draft of Part V is only 2·1/2 pages long.

But it may

distract the reader (as it did me to some extent) to be
confronted with this new argument after the opinion already
has disposed of the more exacting arguments.

Putti~this

differently) if a stop at a fixed checkpoint may be made
without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, it
goes almost without saying that the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment is not applicable.

It would be a little

like saying that, after the Court had decided Terry, a warrant
still was required to make the "stop and frisk".
I wonder whether it is not iBK feasible to move the
Sifuentes contention forward to somexaEk& earlier point
in the draft and dispose of it in a paragraph or even in
a footnote .

If this is done, you may need to address

Camara to the point of distinguishing it.

8.

Vl
I also have difficultyw with Part VI.

It comes,

at least so it seems to me, as a distinct anticlimax.
If necessary at all, I would certainly condense it sharply.
I agree that the Court of Appeals discussion of the
inappropriateness of the location of San iB Clemente came
(as I recall) in its discussion of my suggestion in
Almeida-Sanchez.

Since we have indicated early in the

draft that the area warrant issue need not be considered
in this case, I would prefer not to "back into it" near
..,

the end of the opinion.

Apart from disturbing the symmetry

and flow of the opinion, I have in mind that several Justices
stated at the Conference a desire not to reach the area
warrant issue.

I do think it necessary to say somewhere

that the location of a checkpoint is an administrative
decision not to be disturbed in the absence of a showing
that the location bears no reasonable relation to the
government's purpose.
At the bottom of page 38, the draft assumes that
the defendants make the general argument that the San

9.
Clemente checkpoint itself is unconstitutionally located.
I do not recall an argument being made in precisely these
terms.

The issue would arise only in the context of an

individual being stopped-

If he were stopped in downtown

Los Angeles, the location of the checkpoint would be one
of the factors to be considered.

a

~

But would anyone have a

particular location is unconstitutional?

Even if so,

that is not the case before us.
I would suggest that we not identify a generalized
,,.

attack on the location of San Clemente as a separate issue.
Rather, it could be included far more briefly as a element
in the nature and extent of the intrusion upon defendant's
freedom of movement.

Arguably, I suppose, there is a

something to be said for the view that it is worse to be
stopped on a busy, express highway, than on the different
J~•

type of highway involved in Sifuentes.

On the other

hand, arguments to the contrary are quite conceivable .

*

****

i ,t•

10.
My

observations above are not definitive.

They

reflect my preliminary impressions from reading the draft,
and 1 may well defer to your more thorough knowledge of
these cases.
1 am certain that a 41-page opinion is too long.
And, apart from length alone, this draft lacks the
cohesion and unity are characteristic of kB your more
finished products.
w~th

In short, 1 suggest that you proceed

a second draft that moves somewhat more swiftly and

tightly in its analysis and arguments.
Having said all of this, 1 recognize that you have
achieved a near miracle in producing any draft at all in
three or four days.

Moreover, 1 recognize this as an

excellent first effort and imply no negative thoughts as
to the merit and usefulness of the draft.
1 particular appreciate your anxiety to give me an
"early shot" at one of our Court opinions.

1 suggest now

that you take your time to produce a second draft, perhaps
planning to get it to me by Monday morning, May 17.

ikaa

This k should enable us to come up with a Chambers draft
before 1 leave for the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference.

" "
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ltider A, p . 14 (Border Search)

The record in No. 75•5387, with respect to the
Sarita

chec~point,does

information.

not provide comparable statistical

As the highway there carries substantially

less traffic than at Sam Clemente, it may be assumed that
fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there.

But fewer

pass by undetected, as every motorist is questioned.

I
l
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Rider A1 p. 16 {Border Search)

It is agreed that checkpoint stops .are "seizures"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

The defendants

therefore contend primarily that the random stopping of
vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brisnoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion.

Defendants also contend, alternatively,

that checkpoint stops in the absence of such suspicion are
p ermissible only when the practice has the advance judicial
authorization of a valid warrant.

As we reach the argument

of a warrant requirement only if reasonable suspicionis
not required for these stops, we turn first to defendants'
principal contention that there must be articulable facts
justjfying reasonable suspicion as a
valid stop.

8a

pr~quisite

to any

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 18 <Border Search)

The government argues persuasively that the operation
of routine checkpoints, as in these cases, is the most
effective means of monitoring the major routes inland.

..

,

A requirement that stops at such checkpoints be

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 19 (Border Search)

Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search.

We view such a checkpoint stop

in a different light from a roving patrol stop.

The

objective intrusion - the stop itself, questioning and
visual inspection - is equally limited in both cases.
But the subjective intrusion - the generating of concern
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers - is
appreciably less in a checkpoint stop.

In Ortiz, we

noted

'

f

i

~
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Rider A, p. 20 (Border Search)

MOtorists regularly using these highways know, or
may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints.
Second, the regularized manner in which these fixed checkpoints ar e operated minimizes the opportunity for abuse of
authority, and reassures law-abiding motorists that the
stops are routinely made in the public iaax interest.
Finally, the location of fixed checkpoints is not chosen
by officers is the field, but by officials responsible
for making overall decisions as to the most effective
allocation of limited enforcement resources.

We may

assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a
checkpoint where it bears disproportionately or oppressively
on motorists as a class.

Moreover, while the choice of

a checkpoint location must be left largely to the
discretion of these officials, the reasonableness of a
given location is subject to judicial review.

;
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Rider A, p. 22 (Border Search)

Defendant't.} basic position is that government officials
may stop no motorist on a public highway for questioning
in the absence of individualized suspicion.

This is

tantamount to saying no such stops ever may be made on
normally traveled highways as, absent a capability of
following a passing vehicle, there si~ply is insufficient
opportunity to justify selecting a particular vehicle from
a stream of passing traffic.

The logic of defendants'

position would preclude one of the standard means employed
by governments at state and local levels of enforcing laws
with respect to drivers' licenses, safety inspections,
weight limits, and

s~ilar

matters.

As such laws are not

before us, we intimate no view at this time other than to
note that the practice of stopping motor vehicles briefly
for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility,
and is a practice which motorists generally accept as
incident to highway use.
We are unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment principles
to preclude the stopping of motorists for brief questioning
and
under reasonable circumstances/for a legitimate purpose.

2.
No decision of this Court has gone so far, and the rationale
of prior decisions support the view that we affirm today.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 623 (1967) the Court
required an "area warrant" supporting the reasonableness
of inspecting private residences for building code violations
within a particular area, but recognized thereby that neither
probable cause nor individualized suspicion was required to
enter any particular building.

In so holding, the Court

examined the governmental interest advanced to justify a
recognized "intrusion upon the constitutional protected
interests of the private citizen", id. at 535, and concluded

-

under the circumstances that such interest outweighed that
of the private citizens.

Moreover in this case we are

concerned neither with searches nor with the sancity of
private dwellings.

One's expectation of privacy in an

automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly
different from the traditional expectation of privacy in
a home or office.
~·

Chambers v. Meroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970);

v. Ortiz, supra, n. 2 at ___ .

3.
The purpose of the stops by the Border Patrol in the
cases before us is legitimate and in the public interest.
We also think the circumstances under which the stops were
made and the procedures followed reasonably further the
governmental purpose with a minimum intrusion ·upon Fourth
Amendment interests.

Accordingly, we hold that the stops

and questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
reasonable suspicion.
We further believe that it is constitutional

~o

refer motorists selectively to the secondary inspection
area at the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria
that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop.

Thus, even

if it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on
the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,
constitutional violation.
Ponce, supra, at ___ •

9

we perceive no

Cf. United States v. Brignoni-

As the intrusion here is sufficiently

minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify
it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol officers h.:.:.
must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be
diverted for the brief questioning here involved.

10

..

1
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Rider A,

p.

22 (Border Search)

Defendant's basic position is that government officials
may stop no motorist on a public highway for questioning
in the absence of individualized suspicion.

This is

tantamount to saying no such stops may be made on normally
traveled highways as, absent a capability of following a
passing vehicle, there simply is insufficient opportunity
to make .t he necessary observations to justify selecting a
particular vehicle from a stream of passing traffic.

The

logic of defendants• position would preclude, for example,
one of the standard means employed by governments at state
and local levels to enforce laws with respect to drivers'
licenses, safety inspections, weigh limits, and similar
matters.

As such laws are not before us, we intimate no

view at this time other than to note that the practice of
stopping motor vehicles briefly for questioning has a
long history, and is a practice with which motorists are
fully familiar.
We are unwilling to extend Fourth Amendment principles
to preclude the stopping of motorists for brief questioning
under reasonable circumstances and for a legitimate purpose.

2.
No decision of this Court has gone so far, and the rationale
of prior decisions support the view that we affirm today.
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

(1967)

~. ~. 523/~

the Court

required an "area warrant$ supporting the reasonableness
of inspecting private residences for building code violations,
but recognized thereby that neither probable cause nor
I

individualized suspicion was required to enter any
particular building.

In so holding, the Court examined

the governmental interest advanced to justify a recognized
"int rusion upon the constitutional protected interests of
the private citizen",

-i d.

at 535,. and concluded that

the governmental interest outweighed that of the private
citizens.

--
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Rider A1 g. 24 (Border Search)

Defendants' alternative argument is that, in any
event, random checkpoint stops at a checkpoint must be
authorized by a judicial warrant.

12

It is suggested that

a warrant requirement in these circumstances draws some
report from Camara, where the Court held that a warrant
was required to conduct a building code inspection, even
though there was no cause to believe that there were
11

violations in a particular building.
that Camara is an apt model.

We do not think

It involved the search of

private residences and offices, for which a warrant
traditionally has been required.
v. United States, supra.

See,~·&·,

MCDonald

As developed more fully above,

the Fourth Amendment interests that normally justify
the warrant requirement are absent here.

The degree of

intrusion upon privacy of a search of an automobile
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from a stop for questioning as to
citizenship.

Moreover, other supportive purposes served

by the warrant requirement are inapplicable.

One such

purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the

2.

_____

evaluation of reasonableness of a search or seizure.
See --------- v.

,

u.s. _,.

v. United States District Court, supra, at

United States

-·

The

reasonableness of checkpoint stops, however, turns on
the location and method of operation of the checkpoint,
factors that are not susceptible to the distortion of
hindsi~ht,

and therefore will be open to post-stop review

notwithstanding the absence of a warrant.

Another purpose

for a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment
of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing
officer,

!a·, at ___ $;but the need for this is less

evident when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in
the hands of the officer in the field.

Note to Car 1 :
Part V, as you know has concerned me.

I have not

had an opportunity to review again carefully the briefs
and opinions below (as I should and hope to be able to do).
I accept your conclusion that the warrant argument is made

3.
with sufficient specificity to require answering.
It is still not clear to me, however, whether the
argument is supportive of the type of area warrant that
I described in Almeida-Sanchez, or whether some other type
of warrant is said to be necessary.

The Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit devoted a large of its opinion to
rejecting the area warrant idea, and I had thought that
defendants agreed with CA9 in this respect.

It is not

clear to me, from what has been said either by you or
me in Part V, whether we are talking about the type of
warrant that actually was issued in Martinez (and found
to be deficient in various respects) or whether defendants
have described some other type of warrant.
defendants

a ~e

I assume

aot suggesting that a warrant must be

issued prior to eaQ.h stop - an absurdity on its face.
In

sum, I think Part V needs clarification.

The

revision I have suggested is as vague on this point as
your draft, as I am not presently advised as to exactly
what type of warrant defendants contend that the Fourth
Amendment requires.

lfp/ss
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5/19/76

Defendants• alternative argument is that, in any
event, random stops at a checkpoint must be authorized
by a judicial warrant.

12

It is suggested that a warrant

requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that an area warrant
was required to conduct a building code inspection, even
though there was no cause' to believe that there were
violations in any particular building.
We do not think that Camara is an apt model.

It

involved the search of ,. private residences and offices,
for which a warrant traditionally has been required.
See,

~·&·•

McDonald v. United States, supra.

more fully above, the Fourth

As developed

Amendment~ interests

that

normally justify the warrant requirement are absent here.
The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may be occasioned
by a search of a house or even an automobile hardly
can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as to
citizenship.

Moreover, other supportive purposes served

by the warrant requirement are inapplicable.

One such

purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 20 (Border Search Cases)

MOtorists using these highways are not taken by
surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the
location of the checkpoints.

The regularized manner in

which established checkpoints are operated is visible
evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the
public interest.

lfp/ss

Rider
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Note to Carl:

(Border Search Cases)

I continue to think that the "administrative"

stops relating to use of the highways are relevant.

Violations

of laws regulating such use result in criminal penalties,
often revocation of a driver's license - a very serious
penalty.

These are no more "administrative" than the

searches in Camara, where the Court rejected a total
distinction - as I recall - between administrative and
searches intended to implement the criminal law.

I am

willing to leave this reference out of the text, but would
like to add a footnote along the following lines:

"The logic of defendants' position, if realistically
pursued, would deprive goverrunent officials at all levels
from ever stopping motorists on public highways for
i

questioning in the absence of individualized suspicion.
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those here
involved, are used widely by governments at state and local
levels as one means of enforcing laws with respect to
drivers' licenses, safety inspections, weigh limits and
similar matters.

As such laws are not before us, we

intimate no view with respect to them at this time other
than to note that the practice of stopping motor vehicles
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its
utility, and is a practice which motorists accept as
incident to highway use.

The fact that the purpose of such

laws is said to be administrative is irrelevant when weighing
the intrusiveness of the interruption of one's travel.

'

'

LFP/gg

Border Search Cases
Rider A, p. 22

5-21-76

The defendants note correctly that individualized suspicion
is usually a prerequisite to a consttutional search or
seizure.

See Terry v • .Q.h!.2, 392 U.s. _ , and n. _ _ •

But the Fourth Amendment
of such suspicion.

~poses

no irreducible requirement

This is clear from Camara v. Municipal

Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

See also Almeida-Sanchez v.

United States, supra, at _

(Powell, J., concurring);

~.;

at _____ (White, J., dissenting); eollonoade Catering

Corp. v. United States, 397 u.s. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 u.s. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States, supra,
In Camara the Court required an "area warrant"

at---·

supporting the reasonableness of inspecting private residences
for building code violations within a particular area,

but

expressly recognized that neither probable cause nor
individualized suspicion was r•quired to enter any particular
'residence.

In so holding, the Court examined the governmental

interest advanced to justify a recognized "intrusion upon
the constitutionally protected interest of the private
citizen", id. at 535, and concluded that under the

-

circumstances such interest outweighed that of the
citizens.

p~ivate

In this case we are concerned neither with

2.

searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See,~·~··

H£Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (

).

As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in
an automobile and of freedom in ita operation are significantly
different from the traditional expectation of privacy in
one's residence.
(1970);

~·

Chambers v. Maroney, 399

u.s.

42, 48

v. Ortiz, supra, at ____ , n. 2.

The purpose of the stops by the Border Patrol
'

'

in the cases before us is legitimate and in the publ'ic
interest.

We also think the circumttances under which the

stops were made and the procedures followed reasonably
I

further the governmental purpose with a minimum intrust.on .
upon Fourth Amendment interests.

Accordingly, we hold

that the stops and questioning at issue may be made in the
absence of individualized suspicion.
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant.
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UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

I
A

The respondents in No. 74-1560 arc defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
in three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. W c previously have had occasion to describe the checkpoint as
follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large blaek on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway arc a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes art' official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There arc also floodlights for
United States v. Ort1"z,
nighttime operation.'"
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Rupp. 398, 410-411 (ED Cal. 1973).

J

I
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The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic screens visually all northbound vehicles, which the
checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, stop. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
~ cars to a secondary inspection area, where ~
pants are asked about their citizenship and immigration
status. The Government informs us that at San Clemente the average length of an investigation in the secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for Government 53. A direction to stop in the secondary
inspection area could be based on something suspicious
about a particular car passing through the checkpoint,
but the Government concedes that none of the three
stops at issue in No. 74-1560
ase on any articulable suspicion. During the period when these stops
were made, the San Clemente checkpoint was operating
under a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop
operation at the Sa.n Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case.
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the San
The parties disagree as to whether Yehiclcs no t rcf<'rrcd to the
secondary inspection area arc brought to a complete halt or merely
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rr~olntion of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may [ I sumc, arguendo, that, all motorists passing through the checkpoint a,re 80 slowed as to have been
"seized."
2
The "warrant of inspection" was sought because the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit alrrady had held that random checkpoint stops could not be made abRent such a. warrant. See United
,
States v. Esquer-R·ivcra, 500 F . 2cl 313 (1974) , Sec also n.
in fra.
1

74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION
4

UNITED STATES v . .MARTINEZ-FUERTE

Clemente checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two
female passengers. The women were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego, to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
~ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence obtained at the chrC'kpoint on the ground that its
operation was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3
The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted
on both counts after a jury trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
a passenger who had been smuggled across the border at
San Ysidro and picked up for transportation by prearrangement. Questioning a.t the checkpoint revealed
the illegal status of the passenger, and Jiminer,-Garcia
was charged in two counts with illegally transporting an
alien, 8 U. S. C. ~ 1324 (a) (2), and conspiring to commit
tha.t offense. 18 U. S. C. ~ 371. His motion to suppress
the evidence derived from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Famando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
:lEach of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. B1ignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]hore may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a. witness at triaJ,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subj ect to suppression . . . ." The
question a.gajn is not before us.
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driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area. revea.led that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan
had led the other aliens across the border at the beach
near Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with a
United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Gov-ernment appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jininez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barra.gan. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether
the routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment." The Court
of Appeals held that these stops violated the Fourth
Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects
the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable
facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's conviction , and affirmed the orders to suppress in the other cases. 514
F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand.
The prosecution of Martinrz-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
5
1118 principal question before the Court of AppeaJs was the
com;titutional significance of the "wa rrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. -, infra. The Government, ho·wcver, preserved
tho question of whether routine checkpoint Htops could be made
ab::;ent a warrant.
4

,\·
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B

Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U.S.
Highwa.y 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north frmn the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-00 miles from the nearest point of the
M-exican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that of the San Clemente
IS operated Ifferently in
checkpoint, but t
that the officers customarily stop a.ll northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are wa.ved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
()J -......._ ~n _Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conc::r-- ducted ~judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. .When an agent approached his vehicle, however, he observed four passengers in the vehicle, one in the front seat and the other three in the
rea~ slumped down in the seats. Questionii1g revealed that each passenger was an illegal alien, a.lthough Sifuentes was a United States citizen. The
aliens had met Sifuentes in the United States, by prearrangement, after swimming a.cross the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illega.Ily
transporting aliens.
8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2).
He
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was denied a.nd he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that routine stops made without
reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals

V"'

:.

'·
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for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 ( 1975·). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops a.re
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We a.fiirm. 6
II

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law
enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many years to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the a.nnual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 402. Many more ali-ens than can be accommodated
under the quota want to live and work in the United
States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens seek
illegally to enter or to remain in the United States. We
noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of illegal immigrants [already] in the United Stat-es vary
widely. A conservative estimat-e in 1972 produced a
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and
N aturaliza.tion Service now suggests there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens in the country." United
We initially granted the Go\·emment's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. - , and later granted Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the rases be argued in
tandem. U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to consolidnte the cnses for oral argument.
-U.S.-.
6
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975)
(footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85o/o of the
illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by Lhe fact
that economic opportunities arc significantly greater in
the United States than they are in Mexico. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. Th e principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. !d. , at
405. The United States shares a land border with Mexico that is almost 2.000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, -electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It is also
possible for an alien to enter unla\~ly ·at a port of
entry by ·the use of falsified pa.pers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available. frequently reJ*k:~6"tr.,__-<
....--J.,n g with friends or professional smugglers who transport
them in private vehicles. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 879.
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland traffic-checking opera.tions
m an effort to']~~·even t illegal inm1igration. Permanent
checkpoints, su~h as those at San Clemente and Sarita,
ar-e maintained at or near intersections of important
roads leading away from the border. They operate on
7
The latter occurs particularly where '·border passcl:is " are isr>ued
io simplify pa,:sage bctmc>en interrrlated intrmational rommunilies
along the border. The.~e pa ·se;; authorize travel within 25 miles
or the border for a 72-hour ]lcriod. Sec 8 CFR § 212.6 ( 1975) .
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a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens.
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent
ones, occasionally arc established in other stra.tegic locations. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to cover
more isolated areas. See Alme1:da-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" agents sta,tioned at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9 Most of the·
traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints,
though precise figures are not available. United States
v. Baca, supra, at 407.
B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anumber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to assure effectiv<'ness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas nBar the border, (ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading a.way
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts
8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statut·ory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrognte those beliOircd to be aliens as to their ri~ht to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a) ( 1), (a.) (3).
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anY'vhere·
within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR §287.1(a) (1975).
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable" means "a
person who has been fotmd to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973). Most illegal aliens arc simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smuggler::;, many of whom arc lawfully in tho United States.
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vehicle passage around the checkpoint,. (iv) on a
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 5, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint.
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint each
year, although it actually is in operation only about 70%
of the time.t 0 In calendar year 1973, 17,000 aliens were
apprehended there. During a.n eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124Vu hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
~
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would h~ve .~ ~
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although~
Government contends that many more illegal aliens pass
through the San Clemente checkpoint undetected. The
record in No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. It
may be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended
there but that fewer pass by undetected, as every motorist is questioned.
III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United States
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are cau~ed by personnel shortages,
wea.thcr conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads.
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v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528, 530-531 (1967). In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, .mpra, at
20-21, a process evident in our previous cases dealing
with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
a search could be conducted only if there was probable
cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at
least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing
random searches by roving patrons in a given area.
Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J.,
concurring), a.nd id., at. 288-289 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to veh~cle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
apropriately are subject to Jess stringent constitutional
safeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol
could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence
status simply because they were in the general area of
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment rights involved in such a stop was "modest,"
id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law en-
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forcement needs. We therefore held that an inquiry stop
need not be justified by probable cause and may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of specific articulable facts, together with the rational inferences from
those facts, that reasonably warrant the suspicion" that a
vehicle contains illegal aliens." I d., at 884. 11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that the random stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends in
No. 75-5387 that checkpoint stops in the absence of such
suspicion are permissible only when the practice has the
advance judicial authorization of a warrant. There was
a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but
none at Sarita. As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if reasonable suspicion is not required,
we turn first to whether checkpoint officers must be aware
of articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion as a
prerequisite to a valid stop.
A

Our previous cases have recognized that maintena.nce
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
eff-ectively at the Border. We note here only the
substantiality of the public interest in the particular practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, which the Government identifies as the most important of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the
l l On the facts of the caile, we concluded that the stop was impermissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking.
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United States 19-20. 12 These checkpoints a.re located
on important north-south highways; in their absence
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe
route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries
apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect.
of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient highways tha,t are less heavily travelled, slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by
roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, a.t 883-885.
The Government argues persuasively that routine
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of monitoring the major routes inland. A requirement that
stops at such checkpoints be based on individualized
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic
on these highways tends to be too heavy to allow the
· 9.~ study of a given car that would allow it
to be identified as possibly carrying illegal aliens. Such
a requirement also would largely eliminate a.ny deterrent
to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations.

u The defendants argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other
than by chec.kpoint opern.iions. As one a!t,ernative they suggest
/
V _
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of
~~~ t he logic of such elaborate less-restrictivea ~ lead ~ to e raiSing o msupera/ /
--- V tJ!.
blo barriers against virtually all sea.rch and seizure powers. In any
~event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that
a.ll traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a promise our
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest f
..
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on causeless stops. Compare United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883 (effectiveness of roving
patrols not defeated by reasonable suspicion requirement), with
infra, at 18.
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B

While the need to make random checkpoint stops is
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925), a.nd arguably on their
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle occupants is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a. right to
be in the United States.' " United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, a.t 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a seaJ·ch. We view such a checkpoint
stop in a different light from a roving-patrol stop. The
objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and
the visual inspection-is equally limited in each case.
But the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we
noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and sea.rch are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
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ment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U. 8., at 882. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers . . . . [They] could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street,, a busy highway, or a desert road .. .. " /d., at 882-883. There also
. /
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
~ ~
would be abused by th€ officer ~ tlie field. Ibid.
/
Routine checkpoint stops do I v intrude similarly ------ s V
on the motormg pu IC.
ence with legitimate traffic
otons
~
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field , but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We ma.y assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint.
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as.
a class.. Moreover 1 while the choice of a checkpoint
location must be left largely to the discretion of these
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject
to judicial review.
The defendants arrested a.t the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a, significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small num-·

•/
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ber of ca.rs are referred to the secondary inspection area.
We do not agree. Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into
r·esidence status that caJmot feasibly be made of every
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal.
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusiveness, but it remains true that the stops should not be
frightening or offensive because of their public and
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective referrals-rather tha.n questioning the occupants of every
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests
by minimi:r,ing the intrusion on the general motoring
public.

c

The defendants note correctly tha.t some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure. 13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See ~1so Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, a.t 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce la.ws rega.rding
drivers' licf'nses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, HJJd the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that 1ifte practiCe of stopping automobiles briefly
for questioning
as a ong istory cyj encing 1ts
ublity and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use .
' 3
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289 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Collonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
supra, at 154. In Camara the Court required an "area
warrant" to support the reasonableness of inspecting
private residences for building code violations within a
particular area, but expressly recognized that neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion was required to
enter any particular residence. In so holding, the Court
examined the governmental interest advanced to justify
a rec~ized "intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen," id., at 535, and
concluded that under the circumstances such interest
outweighed that of the private citizens.
In this case we are concerned neither with searches
nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S ..
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacyf in one'~denc~ Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); U. S. v. Ortiz, supra,
at 896 n. 2. The purpose of the stops by the Border
Patrol in the cases before us is legitimate and in the
public interest:14 We also think the circumstances under
which the stops were made and the procedures followed
reasonably further the governmental purpose with a
minimum intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.
Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note,
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355(1974).
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issue may be made in the absence of any individualized
suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints.15
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if

(:5

.'!t
. .,

1
$ tvt
J

15 As a judicial wa.rrant authorized the Border Patrol to make
routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circui~
whether routine checkpoint stop8 were constitutional when authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 1, supra. The Court of Appeals hcld
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F. 2d, at 318, and that, it was unreasonable to issue a warrant,
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. !d., at
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the dist.cwce of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interferrnce with
legitillk'tte traffic. Ibid. We need not address thrE"e holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the latter holding and the reliance upon it by the defendants in
No. 74-1560 to raise the question whether, even though a wa.rrant
is not required, it is unren~onable to locate a checkpoint at San
---Clemente.
We ave malca. 1riffla.Qy that the choice of checkpoint~ tions is an administrative deci~ion that must b.c left largely within
the discretion of the Border Pa.t rol, srr supra, nt 21; cf. Camam
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967) . .-a.»ft--mrltn-e~~
question_ttbout the rca~onableness of loeating a chrckpoint at San
emente. The principal focus should be on whrther the checkpoint
reasonably ndvanees the law enforcement need;: tha,t m:1 kP checkpoints constitution::~lly permissible. There ran be little doubt t.hat
the San Clemente checkpoint docs in light. of the high ah~<olute
number of apprchcnflions and the predictability that significant
numbers of illegal aliens will u.~e Interstate 5. Moroovcr, the
Border Patrol has located the checkpoint where San Diego-to-Los
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with
legi't-Unate traffic.
No question has been raised about the rr.asonablcness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
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it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,' 6 we perceive no
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant
16 The record in No. 74-1560 does not necessarily support the
contention that referrals are based ~oldy on apparent Mexican
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motorists are stopped and the
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexican
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute a large
proportion of the popula.tion of Southern California. Brief for
Respondents 42. Moreover, the Government has informed us tha.t
trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to ~~pparent
Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists. Brief for
the United States in No. 75-5387, - . See Brignoni-Ponce, sup1·a,
at 884-885.
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area.
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 20% contained illegal n.Jiens. Supra, at 13. In the~e circumstances, any reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry, see n. 9,
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted
that "[t]he likelihood that any ~ivcn person of Mexican ancestry
is an alien is high enough to make Mexiean appea.mnce a relevant
factor . . . ," although we held thnt :-~pparent Mexican ancestry
by itself could not create the reasonable suRpicion for u rovingpatrol stop. Id., at 885-886. Different considerations would arise
if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry
at a eheckpoint operated ncar the Canadian border.

J '
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requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that an "area" warrant was required to conduct a building code inspection,
even though there was no cause to believe that there
were violations in any pa.r ticular building. 18
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the Fourth Amendment interests that
normally justify the warrant requirement are absent
here. The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may
be occasioned by a search of a house hardly can be compared with the minor interference with privacy resulting
from the mere stop for questioning as to citizenship.
Moreover, other supportive purposes served by the requirement of a warrant are inapplicable. One such purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
States v. Watson, U. S. - , n. 22 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops,
however, turns on the location and method of operation
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of
18

There a.!Ro is some support for a warrant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez, sup:ra, which
commanded the votes of five Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowE.LL,
J., ooncurring); id., at 288-289 (WHI'I'E, J., dissenting). The burden o.f these opinions, however, was that an "area" warrant could
serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search
that otherwise was necessary to sustain the roving-patrol searches.
As particularized suspicion is not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-Sanchez is not an issue in these cases.

.;

.I.!'
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the searching or seizing offices, United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-318 (1972), but
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize"
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field.
The warrant requirement in Camara served Fourth
Amendment interests to whi.ch a warrant requirement
here would make little contribution. The Court there
said:
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores, but we believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra,
at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint searches are
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable
cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. And our
holding today is limited to the type of stops described in
this opinion. "[A]ny further detention . . . must be
based on consent or probable cause." United States v.
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Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 881-882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. Wereverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
cases to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
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I
A

The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
in three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. Wc previously have had occasion to describe the checkpoint as
follows:
" 'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-D. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway arc a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes arc official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition , there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
United States v. Ortiz,
nighttime operation.'"
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp. 398, 410-411 (ED Cal. 1973).
\
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The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic screens visually all northbound vehicles, which the
checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, stop. 1
Most motorists are allowed .t o resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
such cars tO' a secondary inspection area, where its occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration
status. The Government informs us that at San Clemente the average length of an investigation in the secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for Government 53. A direction to stop in the secondary
inspection area could be based on something suspicious
about a particular car passing through the checkpoint,
but the Government concedes that none of the three
stops at issue in No. 74-1560 were based on any articulable suspicion. During the period when these stops
were made, the San Clemente checkpoint was operating
under a magistra.t e's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop
operation at the San Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case.
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the San
1 The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection urea arc brought to a. complete halt or merely
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rcsolution of this dii3pute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, w·guendo, that, all motorist~ passing through the checkpoint arc so slowed as to have been
"seized."
2
The "warrant of inspection" was sought because the COurt of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit already had held that random checkpoint stops could not be made nbsent such a warra.nt. See United
States v. Esquer-Rivem, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). See also n. - ,.
infra.
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Clemente checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two
female passengers. The women were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego, to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
~ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence obtained at the checkpoint on the ground that its
operation was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3
The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted
on both counts after a jury trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
a passenger who had been smuggled across the border a.t
San Ysidro and picked up for transportation by prearrangement. Questioning at the checkpoint revealed
the illegal status of the passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia
was charged in two counts with illegally transporting an
alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). and conspiring to commit
that offense. 18 U. S. C. § 371. His motion to suppress
the evidence derived from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Farnando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
Each of the defendants in No. 74--1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal alieni'. We noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876. n. 2 (1975), that "[t]hcre may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at. trial,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." The
question again is not before us.
3
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driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent sea.rch of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan
had led the other aliens across the border at the beach
near Tijuana., Mexico, where they rendezvoused with a
United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U.S. C. §1324(a)(2), four counts of ·
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Government appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jininez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan! The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether ·
the routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment:5 The Court .
of Appeals held that these stops violated the Fourth
Amendment, concluding that a stop for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol reasonably suspects
the presence of illegal aliens on the basis of articulable
facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the other cases. 514
F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand.
1

The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
5
The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. -, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question of whether routine checkpoint stops could be made
absent a warrant.

.. '
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B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65- 90 miles from the nearest point . of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that of the San Clemente
checkpoint, but the checkpoint is operated differently in
that the officers customarily stop ail northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without any judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached his vehicle, however, he observed four passengers in the vehicle, one in the front seat and the other three in the
rear, who were slumped down in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United States citizen. The
aliens had met Sifuentes in the United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
He
transporting aliens.
8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2).
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was denied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that routine stops made without
reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutionaL The United Sta.tes Court of Appeais
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for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.~
II

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict qn the constitutionality of a law
enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A

It has been national policy for many years to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
ha.s been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, supra,.
at 402. Many more ali€ns than can be accommodated
under the quota want to live and work in the United
States. Consequently, large numbers of aJiens seek
illegally to enrer or to rema.in in the United States. We
noted la.st Term tha.t "[e]stimates of the number of illegal immigrants [already] in the Unired Stares vary
widely. A conservative estima.re in 1972 produced a
figure of about one million, 'but the Immigration and
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens in the country." United
6 We initially granted tho Govern~ent's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U.S.-, and later granted· Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the ca.·es be argued in
tandem. U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to consolirbto the eases for oral argument.
-U.S.-.
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States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975)
(footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85,o/o of the
illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the fact
that economic opportunities are significantly greater in
the United States than they are in Mexico. United
States v. Baca, s·upra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at
405. The United States shares a land border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It is also
possible for an alien to enter unlawuflly at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently rendezvousing with friends or professional smugglers who transport
them in private vehicles. United States v. B1-ignoniPance, supra, at 879.
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol eonducts three kinds of inla.nd traffic-checking operations
in an effort to prevent illegal immigration. Permanent
checkpoints, such as those at San Clemente and Sarita,
are maintained at or near intersections of important
roads leading away from the border. They operate on
7
The latter occurs particuhrly where "border passess" are issued
to simplify passage between interrelated international communities
along the border. These passes authorize travel within 25 miles
of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6 ( 1975).

t'
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a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens.
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent
ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations. Finally, roving pa.trols are maintained to cover
more isolated areas. See Alrneida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" a.gents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9 Most of the
traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints,
though precise figures m·e not available. United States
v. Baca, supra, at 407.
B

We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anumber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to assure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts
8 All these opera.tions are conducted pursuant to statuimy authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U.S. C. §§1357(a)( 1) , (a.)(3).
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anywhere
within 100 miles of t he border. 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1975).
9
As used in these statistics, the term "deportable" means "a
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD CaL
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smugglers, many of whom are lawfull y in the United Sta.tes.

,.
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vehicle passage around the checkpoint,. (iv) on a
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 5, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74--1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint.
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint each
year, although it actually is in operation only about 705-"o
of the time. 10 In calendar year 1973, 17,000 aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74--1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124Yu hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have ·
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, althought the
Government contends that many more illegal aliens pass
through the San Clemente checkpoint undetected. The
record in No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical information rega.rding the Sarita checkpoint. It
may be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended
there but that fewer pass by undetected, as every motorist is questioned.
III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United States
The Sarita eheckpoint. is operated a. compnmbl e proportion of
the time . "Down" periods nrc rauRcd by personnel shortages,
wea.thcr conditionR, and-at San Clemento-peak traffic Joadg.
10

~

.......
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v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528, 530-531 ( 1967). In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
20-21, a process evident in our previous cases dealing
with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment priva.cy interests that
a search could be conducted only if there was probable
cause to believe that a car contained illegal aliens, at
least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing
random searches by roving patrons in a given area.
Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283--285 (PowELL, J.,
concurring) , and id., at 288-289 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
apropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional
safeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol
could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence
status simply because they were in the general area of
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment rights involved in such a stop was "modest,"
id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law en-

~.
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forcement needs. We therefore held that an inquiry stop
need not be justified by probable cause and may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of specific articulable facts, together with the rational inferences from
those facts, that reasonably warrant the suspicion" that a
vehicle contains illegal aliens." !d., at 884. 1 '

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that the random stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignon'i-Ponce
must be read as proscribing stops in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends in
No. 75-5387 that checkpoint stops in the absence of such
suspicion are permissible only when the practice has the
advance judicial authorization of a warrant. There wa.s
a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but
none at Sarita. As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if reasonable suspicion is not required,
we turn first to whether checkpoint officers must be aware
of articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion as a
prerequisite to a valid stop.
A

Our previous cases have recogniz.ed that mainten a.nce
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
effectively at the Border. We note here only the
substantiality of the public interest in the particular practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, which the Government identifies a.s the most important of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the
11

On the facts of the ra se, "·c con cluded that the stop was im~:>u ~picion was lacking.

permi ssible because rcnsonDblc

·,
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United States 19- 20. ' 2 These checkpoints are located
on important north-south highways; in their absence
such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick a.nd safe
route into the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries
apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such higlnvays. And the prospect
of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient highways that are less heavily travelled, slowing their movement and making them more vulnerable to detection by
roving patrols. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 883-885.
The Government argues persuasively that routine
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of monitoring the major routes inland. A requirement that
stops at such checkpoints be based on individualized
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic
on these highways tends to be too heavy to allow the
individualized study of a given car that would allow it
to be identified as possibly carrying illegal aliens. Such
a requirement also would largely eliminate any deterrent
to the conduct of well disguised smuggling operations.
12
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is Jess than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of
illegal aliens. We believe tho logic of such elaborate leRs-restrict ivea.lternative arguments wonld lefld quickly to the rai si1~g of insuperable barriers against virtually all se-arch and seizure powers. In any
event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest forcefully
that tho particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on causeless stops. Compare United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883 (effectiveness of roving
patrols not defeated by reasonable suspicion requirement), with
infra, at 18.
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·While the need to make random checkpoint stops is
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 154 (1925), and a.rguahly on their
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle occupants is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search. We view such a checkpoint
stop in a different light from a roving-patrol stop. The
objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, a.nd
the visual inspection-is equally limited in each case.
But the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern
or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we
noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving pa,trols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, a.nd their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amend-
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ment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U. S., at 882. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers . . . . [They] could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road .... " !d., at 882-883. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by the officer in the field. Ibid.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public. First. the potential interference with legitimate traffic is quite limited. Motorists
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists. that the stops are
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective alloca,...
tion of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
a class. Moreover, while the choice of a checkpoint
location must be left largely to the discretion of these
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject
to judicial review.
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small num-
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ber of cars are referred to the secondary inspection area.
We do not agree. Referrals a.re made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into
r·esidence status that cannot feasibly be made of every
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop and inquiry thus rema.ins minimaL
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusiveness, but it remains true that the stops should not be
frightening or offensive because of their public and
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants of every
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests
by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring
public.

c

The defendants note correctly that some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure. 13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. M'unicipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and locnl levels to enforce laws regnrding
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and ;;imilar
!Ik'Ltters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement. officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that the practice of stopping automobiles briefly
for questioning on such matters has a long history evidencing its
utility and is accepted by motorists ·as incident to highway usc .
13

.....

.
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289 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Collonnade Catering Corp ..
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v ..
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
supra, at 154. In Camara the Court required an "area
warrant" to support the reasonableness of inspecting
private residences for building code violations within a
particular area, but expressly recognized that neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion was required to
enter any particular residence. In so holding, the Court
examined the governmental interest advanced to justify
a recongized "intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen," id., at 535. and
concluded that under the circumstances such interest
outweighed that of the private citizens.
In this case we are concerned neither with searches
nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S ..
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy in one's residence. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 (1970); U. S. v. Ortiz, supra,
at 896 n. 2. The purpose of the stops by the Border
Patrol in the cases before us is legitimate and in the
public interest. 14 We also think the circumstances under
which the stops were made and the procedures followed
reasonably further the governmental purpose with a
minimum intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests.
Accordingly, we hold that the stops and questioning at
14 The public a.n d private interes ts cliscussed here have been
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note,
Nonarrest Automobile Stops : Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in
Border Zones : Almeida-SaJJchez and Camara, 84 Ya.le 1 . J. 355
(1974).
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issue may be made in the absence of any individualized
suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints?"
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
15 As a judicial wa.r rant authorized the Border Patrol to make
routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 1, supra. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a. warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a. wa.rra.n t
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id. , at
321-322. In reaching the latter conelusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the flow] frequency with which illegal aliens
pa::;s through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
tho checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid . We need not address thf'se holdings specifica.lly, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the la.t ter holding and the reliance upon it by the defendants in
No. 74-1560 to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to loca.te a checkpoint at San
Clemente.
We have indicated already thnt the choice of checJ,point locations is an administrative deci~ion that must be left largely within
the discretion of the Border Pntrol, ~ee supra, nt 21; cf. Camm·a
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967), and we have ll(}
question about the reasonnblene ~s ·of locating a checkpoint at S11n
Clemente. The principal focus should be on whether the checkpoint
renl'onnbly ndv:mres the law enforcement needs that mnke C'hf'rkpoints constitutionally permissible. There cnn be little doubt that
the San Clemente l'hcckpoint does in light of the high absolute
number of a.pprehensionfi nnd the predictability that significant
numbers of illegal aliens will use Inter~tate 5. Moreover, the
Border Patrol has ]orated the checkpoint where Snn Diego-to-L<>s
Angeles trnffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with
legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the rea r;o nnblene8s of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
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it be assumed that such referrals are ma.de largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry,t6 we perceive no
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follo,vs that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.17

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant
The rerord in No . 74-1560 does not necessarily support the
contention that referrals are based solely on apparent Mexican
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motori~ts are stopped and the
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexica.n
ancestry and legally re. ident Mrxican citizens constitute a la,rge
proportion of the populn.tion of Southern California.. Brief for
Respondents 42. Moreover, the Government has informed us that
trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to apparent
Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists. Brief for
the United States in No. 75--5387, - . See Brignoni-Ponce, supra,
at 884-885.
H Of the 820 vehicles referred to the seconcla.ry inspect ion a.rea
during the days surrounding the arre~:>ts involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 20% conta.ined illegnl aliens. S1~pra , at 13. In these circumstances, any reliance on apparent Mexican nncoRtry, see 11. 9,
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted·
that "[t]he likelihood thnt nny given perRon of Mexican ancestry
is an alien is high enough to make Mexiean appearance a relevant
factor . . . ," although we hold that apparent Mexican ancestry
by itself could not create tho reasonable suspicion for a rovingpatrol stop. ld., at 885--886. Different considerations would arise
if, for example, reliance were put 011 apparent Mexican ancestry
at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border.
16
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requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that an "area" warrant was required to conduct a building code inspection,
even though there was no cause to believe that there
were violations in any particular building. 18
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the Fourth Amendment interests that
normally justify the warrant requirement are absent
here. The degree of intrusion upon privacy that may
be occasioned by a search of a house ha.rdly can be compared with the minor interference with privacy resulting
from the mere stop for questioning as to citi%enship.
Moreover, other supportive purposes served by the requirement of a warrant are inapplicable. One such purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
U. S. - , - n. 22 (MARSHALL,
States v. Watson , J. , dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops,
however, turns on the location and method of operation
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of
18 There also is some support for a warrant rcquirrmcnt in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, which
commanded the votes of five Justices. Sec id., at 283-285 (PowE.LL,.
J ., concurring); id., at 288-289 (WRITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however, was that an "area" warr::mt could
serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search
that otherwise was necessary t,o sustain the roving-patrol searches.
As particularized suspicion is not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-Sanchez is not an isstle in these cases.

...
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the searching or seizing offices, United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 316-318 ( 1972), but
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize"
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field.
The warrant requirement in Camara served Fourth
Amendment interests to which a warrant requirement
here would make little contribution. The Court there
said:
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U.S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores, but we believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 24.-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra,
at 881- 882. We have held that checkpoint searches are
constitutional only if justified by consent or probable
cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra. And our
holding today is limited to the type of stops described in
this opinion. "[A]ny further detention . . . must be
based on consent or probable cause." United States v.

!
f
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Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 881-882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. Wereverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
cases to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered .
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) . We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant.
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I

A
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We pre·viously have described the checkpoint as follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway are a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation.'"
United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp. 398, 410-411 (SD Cal. 1973).
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with"'
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
aoncfude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the check..point, but the Government concedes that none of the
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any
articulable suspicion. During the period when these
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop
operation at the San Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motorists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been
"seized."
2 The record
does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rotb
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without
such a warrant . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F . 2d 960 (1974),
aff'd, on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v.
l!IBfJ'I>I!BF RirJetf1i498 F. 2d 7 (1974) . Soon after the warrant issued,
the Court of Appeals held that random stops alone also could not
·be made absent such a warrant. See United States v. Esquer~.
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). SeE:; also n. 15, infra ..
1
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the case.
Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached the
checkpoint driving a vehicle cnotaining two fe.
male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro·
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 3 The motion to suppr·ess was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury
trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by prearrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C.
3 Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted m United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seizecf
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." The·
· question again is not before us.
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived;
from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Me,_
drano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillffi
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near·
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen,
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., § 1324 (a)( 4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The Dis-.
trict Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Government appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol
The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be madt>·
aQsent a wa,rraE:t; ..
4
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand,

B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was ar~
rested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. ' The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-90 lniles from the nearest point of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente,
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that
the officers customarily stop all northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached his vehicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United
States citizen. · The aliens had met Sifuentes in the
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across
the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
He
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2).
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress theevidence derived from the stop. The motion was de..

74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

1

nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that stops made without reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.0

II
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law
enforoement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many years to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp., at 402. Many more alien.s than can be accommodated under the quota want to live and work in the
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens
seek illegally to enter or to remain in the United Sta,t es.
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary
6
We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. - , and later granted Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that t he cases be argued in
U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of
tandem. the Solicitor General to consolidate the cases for oral a.rgument ,

~u . s . -.
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widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at
405. The United States shares a land border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It also is
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers
who transport them in private vehicles. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879.
As we have noted previously, the Border Patrol con7
The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within ·.
25 miles of the. bord!)r_ for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6 .
(1975) •.
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ducts three kinds of inland traffic-checking operations in
an effort to minimize illegal immigration. Permanent
checkpoints, such as those at San Clemente and Sarita,
are maintained at or near intersections of important
roads leading away from the border. They operate on
a coordinated basis designed to avoid circumvention by
smugglers and others who transport the illegal aliens.
Temporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent
ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations. Finally, roving patrols are maintained to cover
more isolated areas. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United
States v. Baca, supra, at M)5, 407 and n. 2.

B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as8

All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§1357(a)(l), (a)(3).
Under current regulations this authority may be exercised anywhere
within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR § 287.1(a) (1975).
9
As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug~lers, II\(\·ny qf whqm ate tawf\Jlly in the United States.
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the
confluence of two 6r more significant roads leading away
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts
vehicle passage around the checkpoint~ (iv) on a
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint.
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in
operation only about 70 % of the time. 1 0 In calendar
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124Vs hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. It may
be assumed that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended
there but that fewer pass- by undetected, as every motorist is questioned.
'lo The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages,
weather conditions1 and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads.
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III
"l:'he Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United Statesv. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528 (1967).
In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I,
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
a search could be conducted without consent only if there
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL,
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and·
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional
$afeguards. The question was whether a roving patrol"

.,
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could stop motorists for inquiry into their residence
status simply because they were in the general area of
the border. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "modest," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a rovingpatrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at
884.11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 11 seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that thP random stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends
in No. 75-5387 that random checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the advance judicial
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita.
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests
at stake.
A
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
effectively at the border. We note here only the
nOn the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was imp ermissible because reasonabl e suspicion was Jackmg.
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substantiality of the public interest in the particular practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check~
points, which the Government identifies as the most important of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the
United States 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located
on important highways; in their absence such highways
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of
such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885.
The Government argues persuasively that routine
checkpoint stops are the most effective means of monitoring the major routes inland. A requirement that
stops on such highways always be based on reasonable
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of trafficr.
tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study
of a given car that would allow it to be identified as pos12
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced other
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest
the passage of legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of
illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive a]•.
ternative arguments could lead to the raising of insuperable barriers against virtually all search and seizure powers. In any
event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition that
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest persuasively
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on random stops. Compare Unitecf
States v. Brignoni.-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving
patrols not defeated by reasoll).ab)e suspicion requirement), with..
£'nfra, at 13-14,

I
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sibly carrying illegal aliens. Such a requirement also
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
of well-disguised smuggling operations.

B
While the need to make random checkpoint stops is
great, their intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is
quite limited. The stop does intrude on motorists' right
to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925), and a.rguably on their
right to personal security. But it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the United States.' " United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspectionalso existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers~
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at
894-895,
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U. S., at 882--883. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. . . . [T]hey could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road . . , ." Ibid. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity.
The
regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field , but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
a class. Moreover, while the choice of a checkpoint
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location must be left largely to the discretion of these
officials, the reasonableness of a given location is subject
to judicial review.
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars a.re referred to the secondary inspection
area. We do not agree. Referrals are made for the sole
purpose of conducting a routine and limited inquiry into
r·esidence status that cannot feasibly be made of every
motorist where the traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop and inquiry thus remains minimal.
Selective referral may involve some subjective intrusiveness, but it remains true that the stops should not be
frightening or offensive because of their public and
relatively routine nature. Moreover, selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants of every
car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment interests
by minimizing the intrusion on the general motoring
public.

c

The defendants note correctly that to accommodate
public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure. 13 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce la.ws regarding
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters . The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
13
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U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspec~
ing private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was
not required to enter any given residence. [ In so holding,
the Court examined the governmental interest advanced
to justify such random intrusions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," 387 U. S.,
at 534-535, and concluded that under the circumstances
the Government interest outweighed that of the private
citizen.
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here,
where we deal neither with searches nor with the
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Card~
well v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590- 591 ( 1974) (plurality·
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol~
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles
briefly for que tioning has a long history evidencing its utility·
~nd is accel?ted or motorists as incident to highway use.

?£ 7 U, S, J
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lowed in making random checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal.
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by records in the cases
before us. 14 Accordingly, we hold that the stops and
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoints.16
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note,
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Search Warrants in
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355
(1974).
16 As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make routine stops a.t the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 741560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supra. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id., at
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San
Clemente.
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente wa.s reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed.
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 6 we perceive no
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. Brignoni~
Ponce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi~
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved.u
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions during the period in question was high, see supra, at 10,
confirming Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with
legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The record in No. 74-1560 does not necessarily support the
contention that referrals are based solely on apparent Mexican
ancestry, as less than 1% of the motorists are stopped and the
defendants themselves note that American citizens of Mexican
ancestry and legally resident Mexican citizens constitute a large
proportion of the population of Southern California. Brief for
Respondents 42--43. Moreover, the Government has informed u~
that trained Border Patrol agents rely on factors in addition to.
apparent Mexican ancestry when selectively stopping motorists.
Brief for the United States in No. 75--5387, 9; see Brignoni-Ponce,.
422 U. S., at 884-885.
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area
during the days surrounding the arrests mvolved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. In these circumstance , any reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry, see n. 16,
._\_
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v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that random stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant
requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent,
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code
inspection, even though the search could be conducted
absent cause to believe that there were violations in
the building searched.18
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement in that context are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon
supra, clearly was relevant to the law enforcement need to be served.
Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 887, where we noted
that "[t]he likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry
is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant
factor . . . ," although we held that apparent Mexican ancestry
by itself could not create the reasonable suspicion for a rovingpatrol stop. I d., at 885-887. Different considerations would arise
if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry
· at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border.
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however,
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in( dividualized probable cause to search that otherw1se was necessary
to sustain the roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspiCIOn
is not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in Almeida-·
Sanchez is not an issue in these eases.
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privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to
which a warrant requirement here would make little contribution. The Court there said:
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to tpe occupant on these
we believe that the visible manifestations of
the field oftfcers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
Other purposes served by the requirement of
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
States v. Watson, U. S. - , - n. 22 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops,
however, turns on the location and method of operation
of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible to the
distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to
post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant requirement is to
substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of
the searching or seizing officer, United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 316--318 (1972), but
the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize'•
is not entirely in the hands of the officer in the field.

~
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VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop, See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 24--27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra.
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention .. ,.
must be based on consent or probable cause." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,.
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We re·
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other·
case& to the District Court for further proceedings.

It is so ordered_
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) . We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a.
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant.
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I
A

The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We previously have described the checkpoint as follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
.. is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red. lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway are a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation.' "
United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F .
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973).
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic visually screens a.ll northbound vehicles, which the
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with~
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs·
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, but the Government concedes that none of the
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any
articulable suspicion. During the period when these
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop
operation at the San Clemente-location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved·
The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motorists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been
"seized."
2 The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou-tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without
such a warrant . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v.
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 ( 1974). Soon after the warrant issued,
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer~
R-.ivera,. 500 F . 2'd 313' (.W741). Se~ also n_ 15, inf.ra.
1
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two fe,male passengers. The women were illegal Mexican
a.liens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 8 The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury
trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by prearrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C.
8 Each of the defendants in No. 74--1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "lt]here may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subject tQ suppression . . . ." The
question again is not before us.
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived
from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen,
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Government appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Ap~
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol
4

The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
5
The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be made
absent a warra.n t,
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand.

B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente,
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that
the officers customarily stop all northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached his vehicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across
the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
He
transporting aliens.
8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)(2).
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the·
evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de,.

74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

7

nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that stops made without reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm. 6

II
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law
enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many yea.rs to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp., at 402. Many more aliens than can be accommodated under the quota want to live and work in the
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens
seek illegally to enter or to remajn in the United States.
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary
6 We initia.Jly granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. - , and later granted Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in
tandem. U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to conSQlidate the cases for oral argument.

-u.s.-.
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widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at
405. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It also is
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers
who transport them in private vehicles. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879.
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland
traffic-checking operations on an effort to minimize
7

The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican
communities along the border. These pass<>s authonze travel wJthin25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212 .6·

(1976).
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illegal immigratio/.( ermanent checkpoints, such as
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at
or near intersections of important roads leading away
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis
designed to avoid circumvention by s~glers and
others who transport the illegal alien ~ '2.,-temporary
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally -are established in other strategic locations.
Fina~oving patrols are maintained to supplement the
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United
States v. Baca, supm, at 405, 407 and n. 2.

B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anumber of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to asAll these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a)(1), (a)(3) .
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3)
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR
§ 287.1 (a.) (1976).
9 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien " means "a
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-glers, many of whom are lawfllily in the United States.
8
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the operation of the San Clemente checkpoint.
Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in
operation only about 70% of the time. 10 In calendar
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124116 hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there,
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as
every motorist is questioned.
10 The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages,
wel;Lther conditions, and~at San Clemente-peak traffic loads
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III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppres~
sive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United Statesv. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528 ( 1967). In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the·
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle10'ri11egai aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that.
a search could be conducted without consent only if there
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283-285 (PowELL,
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same·
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests ancf
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional
safeguards. The q_uestion w.a8 under what circumstances
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence
status. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "modest," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving~
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at
884.11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend~
ants contend primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brig,noni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion. Sifuentes alternatively contends
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practicf;) has the advance judicial
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita.
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid
'Stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interest-5
at stake.

A
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be con trolled
effectively at the border. We note here only the
11
On the facts of the case, we concluded that tlw stop was linpermissible because reasonable suspicion wax lacking.

74--1560 & 75-5387-0PIN!ON
·uNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

13

-substantiality of the public interest in the particular practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent check...
points, which the Government identifies as the most im..
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the
United States 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located
on important highways; in their absence such highways
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of
such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883- 885.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would la.rgely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
12
The defendants argue at length that t he public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less t han is asserted by t he Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced othel'
than by checkpoint operations. As one alternative t hey suggest
the passage of legislation prohibiting t he knowing employment of
illegal aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive a1..
ternative arguments could lead to the raising of insuperable barriers against virtually all search and seizure powers. In any
event, these arguments tend to go to t he general proposition that
all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our
previous cases reject. The defendants do not suggest persuasively
that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on rout me checkpoint stops. Compare
United States v. B rignoni-Ponce , 422 U. 8., at 883 (effectiveness of
roving patrols not defeate_d by reasonable suspicion requirement).
wit,h infra , at. 13-14..
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.

B
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,
154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers
during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspectionalso existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U. S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . .. [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for·
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by some officers in the field. lbia.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motoristsusing these high ways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. ThtY
regularized manner in which established checkpoints·
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assumethat such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
a class. And since field offic.ers. may stop only those cars.
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passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case
of roving-patrol stops. Mor.eover, while the choice of a
checkpoint location must be left largely to the discretion
of these officials, the reasonableness of a given location
is subject to post-stop judicial review.
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those stopped and reducing
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences.
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the
traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover,
selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public.

c

The defendants note correctly that to accommodate
public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
constitutional search or seizure. 18 See Terry v. Ohio, 392'
18
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
:are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding·
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance m weighing their intrusive-
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U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect..
ing private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at
538. In so holding, the Court examined the governmental interest advanced to justify such random intrusions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that
under the circumstances the government interest outweighed that of the private citizen.
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here,
where we deal neither with searches nor with the
sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
ness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles
brieffy for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility
a.nd is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use.
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expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures followed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal.
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by records in the cases
before us. 14 Accordingly, we hold that the stops and
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoints. 16
14 The public and private interests discussed here have been
elaborated more fully in secondary literature. See, e. g., Note,
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional Seizures of the Person, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 865 (1973); Note, Area Sea.rch Warrants in
Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 Yale L. J. 355
(1974) .
15 As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make routine stops at the San Clemente checkpomt, the principal question
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 741560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supm. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
·F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. !d., at
321-322. In reaching the 1.-.tter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to locatE' a checkpoint at San
Clemente.
We answer this question in the negativE>. As indicated above,.
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 6 we perceive no
constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, a.t 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538
( 1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Cle~
mente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions during the period in question was high, see supra, at 10,
confirmmg Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with
legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
selectively stopping motorists Brief for United States in No. 755387, 9; see United States v. B1'ignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support. in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
whereas the defendants themselves note that American citizens of
Mexican ancestry and legally resident Mexican cit1zens constitute
a much larger proportion of the population of Southern California.
Brief for Respondents, at 42-43 . It thus appears that the Border
Patrol does not place extensive reliance on apparent Mexican
ancestry standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary·
inspection area.
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officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved. 17

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicia1 authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of random stops. A warrant
requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent,
an uarea" warrant was required to make a building code
inspection, even though the search could be conducted
absent cause to believe that there were violations in
the building searched. 18
We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
H Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
rougly 20% contained illegal aliens. S'l.f,pra, at 10. Thus, to the extent
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor ... ," although we held that
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable
suspicion for a roving-patrol stop . ld., at 885-887. Different considerations would arise if, for example, reliance wr re put on apparent
Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian border.
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opimons ip Almeida-Sanchez v. Unitea
States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) , which commanded the votes of five
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). The burden of these opimons, however,
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the in.dividua.lized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary
to sustain the roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion
is not necessary here, the warrant funct10n discussed in AlmeidaSanche~ is not an issue in these cases.
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model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g. , McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement in that context are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to
which a warrant requirement here would make little contribution. The; Court there said :
" [W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
Other purposes served by the requirement of
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such purpose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. Unitea
States v. Watson, - U.S. - , - n. 22 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops,
however, turns on factors such as the location and
method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are
not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding
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the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant
r·e quirement is to substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297,
316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced when
the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the
officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the
administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are con~
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. The principal protection of Fourth
Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate lim~
itations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra.
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ..•
must be based on consent or probable cause." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the·
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,.
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
ca-ses to the District Court for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

JUN 2 9 1976
I

~~

I

111 I J.I 11I J, o, ,z,, ), '

f--ILE CQPY
PLEASE RETUR~
TO FILE

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 74-1560

l
l

AND

75-5387

On Writ . of Certiorari to
1 wner,
U m't ed State s, p et't'
v.
the Umted States Court
74-1560
of Appeals for the
. ·
Amado Martmez-Fuerte et al.
Ninth Circuit.
Rodolfo Sifuentes Petitioner On Writ of Certiorari to
75-5387
'
'
the United States Court
. dv.S
of Appeals for the Fifth
Umte
tates.
Circuit.
[June - , 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusion
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was jncompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975) We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant.
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A
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We previously have described the checkpoint as follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway are a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation.'"
United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F .
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973).
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress with~
out any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the check~
point, but the Government concedes that none of the
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any
articulable suspicion. During the period when these
stops were made, the checkpoint was opera.ting under
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a random-stop
operation at the San Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
1 The partie'! disa.gree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Rffiolution of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motorists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been
"seized."
2
The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Count
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a routine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without
such a wn,rmnt . See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v.
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F . 2d 7 (1974) . Soon after the warrant issued,
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer.=Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 ( 1974). See also n. 15, infra_.
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of thecase. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two female passengers. The w:omen were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his 'passengers admitted _being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress ali evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the
operation of the checkpoint wa.S in violation of the·
Fourth Amendment. 3 The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury
trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by prearrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the
passenger, and Jirriinez-Garcia was cha.rged in two counts
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C.
Each of the defendants in No. · 74-1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. ' 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be
· room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial,
as opposed to a· Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ·." The
,, question agam is not before ·us.
3
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived.
from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near
Tijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen,
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., § 1324 (a)(4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Government appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan! The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Ap-·
peals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol
4
The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
6 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question whetli.er routine checkpoint stops could be mad~
a"!ment. a warrant,
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the
other cases. 514 F . 2d 308. We reverse ~nd remand,

B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, 'Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente,
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that
the officers customarily .stop all northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached his vehicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across··
the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2) . He ·
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the~vidence derived from the stop. The motion was de..
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that stops made without reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm. 6

II
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law
enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many years to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120,000 persons. United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp., at 402. Many more aliens than can be accommodated under the quota want to live and work in the
United States. Consequently, large numbers of aliens
seek illegally to enter or to remain in the United States.
We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of
illegal immigrants [already] in the United States vary
We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560,- U. S. - , and later granted Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in
tandem. U. S. - . Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to couSQ!id.at!:l the cases for oral argument.
6

~u . s . -,
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Widely. A conservative estimate in 1972 produced a
figure of about one million, but the Immigration and
Naturalization Service now suggests there may be as
many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country."
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878
(1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of
the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, drawn by the
fact that economic opportunities are significantly greater
in the United States than they are in Mexico. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at
405. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It also is
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
·but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully.7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers
who transport them in private vehicles. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879.
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize
7
The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued
· to simplify passage - between interrelated American and Mexican
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period See 8 CFR § 212.6.
I (

1976).
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illegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at
or near intersections of important roads leading away
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis
designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations.
Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2.

B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. 'The Border Patrol believes that to as8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. '§§ 1357 (a) (1), (a) (3) .
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3)
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR
§ 287.1 (a) (1976) .
0 As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a
person who has ·been found to be deportable · by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." Unitea States v. Baca, '368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smugglers, many of whom are lawfully in the United States.
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, (ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain 'that· restricts
vehicle passage around the checkpoint~ (iv) on a
stretch of a highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zo.ne in which "border passes,"
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint. Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint
location each year, al~hough the checkpoint actually is in
operation only about 70% of the time. 10 In calendar
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have ·
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical"
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there,
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as
every motorist is questioned.
The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages,
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads.
10
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III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See Unzted States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528 (1967).
In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, ~'Upra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that. searche~ by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy mterests that
a search could be conducted without consent only if there
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compare id., at 273~ with id., at 283-285 (PowELL,
J., concurring) , and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting) .
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
[n United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
a,ppropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional
::~afeguards. The question was under what circumstances

74-1560
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area'
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence
status. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment interests involved in such a stop was "mod-est," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving..
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at
884.11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of ·the Fourth Amendment. The defend ..
ants contend. primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the advance judicial
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita.
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests
at stake.

A
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
·because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
11 On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was impermissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking.
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effectively ·a t the border. We note here only the
substantiality of the public interest in the practice of
routine stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a
practice which the Government identifies as the most im~
portant of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the
United States 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located
on important highways; in their absence such highways
would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into ·the
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many
smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of
such ·highways. And the prospect of such inquities
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest . in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted · by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by
means other than checkpoint operatiOns. As one alternative they
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative argu.
ments could raise insurperable barriers to the exercise of virtually
all search and seizure powers. In any event , these arguments
tend to go to the general proposition that all t raffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject . The
defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met with reliance
on routine checkpoin t stops. Compare United States v. Brigno1liPonce, 422 U. S., at 883 , effectivenrss of roving patrons not defea ted
by reasonable suspicion requirement) , with infra, at 13-14.
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.1

B

·,

While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,
154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers
during which
"'[a] 11 that is required of the vehicle's occupants· is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the United States.' " Unite'd States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants · is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the
stop itself, the questioning, arid the visual inspectionalso existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the
·case of a ·checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened

:

' '

...
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U . S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U.S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The
regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible fol'
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
u class. And since field officers may stop only those c~
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passing the checkpoint1 there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a par-~
ticular exercise of discretion 'in locating or operating a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review.1 3
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection
area, thereby "stigmatizingjj those stopped and reducing
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences.
·Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the
traffic -is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because
· of their public and relative1y routine nature. Moreover,
· selective referrals--rather than questioning the occupants
· of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment
· interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public.

c

"The defendants note correctly that to accommodate
public and private interests some quantum of in, dividualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
1s The choice of checkpoint locations must be left largely to the
' discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15,
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operatiOn also must be com•
mitted to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22.

I
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constitutional search or seizure. 14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283--285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspecting private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at
538. In so holding, the Court examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that
under the circumstances the government interests outweigh those of the private citizen.
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here,
where we deal neither with searches nor with the
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the·
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utilityand is accel?ted ~ l'llPl<.oY.ists as in.cic;ient to highway use.
14

I
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sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See, e. (J., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
' operation .are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence.
United States v. 'Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality
' opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures followed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal.
On the other ·hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the
cases before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and J
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
·checkpoints.16
u As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 741560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 2, supra. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F . 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Jd., at
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San
Clemente.
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/6 we perceive no

lf8,

It./ 0,

the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of a rehensions d.1.u:iHg Ul.11 ~ePi:sa iR 'J'llliiti8H .,, ftEI high, e supra, at 10,
confirming Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San
Clemente was selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los
Angeles traffic is lightest, thereby minimizing interference with
legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
selectively stopping motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75-5387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and lega.Uy resident
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the
population of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California
to be approximately 19,9f1Joo of whom some ~,117,9e8, er 12-%,
are
·
·
. The equivalent percentages
for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are
and 18
_t~~~~~-JJ~ S. Dept. of Gtmgress,
0 Census of Population,
vol. 1, pt. 6,
If the statewide population ratio
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in
No. 74-1560, roughly 1
ould ·be expected to contain person~

3, /I J,.'I

INJ1 v-1 /'
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constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is suffi~
ciently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motor~
ists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved. 17

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant
requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent,
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code
inspection, even though the search could be conducted
absent cause to believe that there were ·violations in
the building searched.18
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 wer.e referred to the
secondary area. This appPars to refute any suggestion that the
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area.
u Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area
during the days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74--1560,
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law
enforcement need to ·be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . ," although we held that
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885-887. Different
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian
border,
'
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United

I
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We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement in that context are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to
which a warrant requirement here would make little contribution. The Court there said:
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no . way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
Other purposes served by the requirement of
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such purStates, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five
Justices. See icl., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however,
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in AlmeidaSanc&l:a is not an issw i:m these cases.

74-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

22

pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
States v. Watson, - U. S. -. -, - n. 22 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting). The reasonableness of checkpoint stops,
however, turns on factors such as the location and
method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are
not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight, and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding
the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for a warrant
requirement is to substitute the judgment of the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer. United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297,
316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced when
the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the
officer in the field, and deference is to be given to the
administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
Toutinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant.u The principal protection of Fourth
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new
intrusion on citizens' rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement.':_'...,J:..~,..--t-
at 1, 2. Since 1946,
60
Congress
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance"
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present
"1location throughout the intervening S&'years. Our prior cases have
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization,
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra,
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief
19

f
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Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra.
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ...
questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither
longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing practices justify a constitutional violation, We do suggest, however,
that against this background and in the context of our recent
ic of
ifi
oncern.
The dissenting opinion also asserts that "the stopped vehicles
cupants are certainly subjected to 'search' as well as
st, at 4. This is indeed novel doctrine. As early
as United St es v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 563 (1927), Mr. Justice
Brandeis, spea g for a unanimous Court, held that a visual inspection of a ship ru d by a searchlight was not a search witilln the
meaning of the Four
If such an inspection of a
vessel is not a "search," one hardl would think that looking
through the windows of an automobile co ·
a search. The
more pertinent question is whether the enforcem t agent has a
right to be in the vantage point from which he m s his observa~
tion, as he does here because of his authority to rna
y
stop. Moreover, in Brignoni-Ponce, an opinion joined by MR.
JusTICE BRENNAN, we made clear that a stop for questioning
involves "no search of the vehicle or its occupants." 422 U. S.,
at
The dissenting opinion further warns:
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that
he travels the fixed checkpoint illghways at [his] risk . . .•" Post,

a.t 6.
For. the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced.
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless
to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican
ancestry.
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must be based on consent or probable cause." Unitea
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,.
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
cases to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
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These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant Wf1S arrested a~ a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Me~ico, ~nd each sought the exclusion
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth
,Amendment. In each inst11nce wh~ther the Fourt4
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
11 vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant.
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A
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
.and Los Angeles, and the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We previously have described the checkpoint as follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on ye'lllow sign with flashing yello·w
qights over the highw.ay stating "ALL VEHICLES,
,'S TOP AHEAD, 1 M'ILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north aJre 'two b1ack on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is a]so the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
Hashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-U. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway are a number
·~f orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
·standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation.'"
United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp. 398, 410--411 (SD Cal. 1973).
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, but the Government concedes that none of the
three stops at issue in No. 74-1560 was based on any
articulable suspicion. During the period when these
stops were made, the checkpoint was operating under
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a routine-stop
operation at the San Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely
~'roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motor~sts passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been
t•seized."
2
The record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a routine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without
such a warrant. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v.
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 (1974). Soon after the warrant issued,
the Court of Appeals also held unconstitutional routine checkpoint
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. EsquerRivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974). See also n. 15, infra.
1
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in No. 74.-1560, and the procedural history of the
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fuerte approached
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two female passengers.
The women were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte pro·
duced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§.1324 (a) (2). He inoved befo'te trial to suppress all evi···
dence stemming from the stop on the ground that the
o.peration of t~1e chec~poinf was in violation of the
Fourth .t\mendment. 8 The motion to supj:wess was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury
triaL
· Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
passenger.. :ije had. pi.cked. the passenger up by prearrangement in San Ysidro after the latter ·haa 'been
&muggled across the border. Questioning at 'the secondary inspectiO!l area revealed' the illegal status of the
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged. in 'two counts
wjth illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. 'S. C. § 1324 (a)
(2), and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C.

one

8

Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . .. " The
' question again is not before us.
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§ 371.

His motion to suppress the evidence derived
from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wi£e as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had
1ed the other aliens across the border at the beach near
'T ijuana, Mexico, where they rendezvoused with Guillen,
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally trans·porting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 13Z4 (a) (2), four counts of
'inducing the illegal en try of aliens, id., § 1324 (a) ( 4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Gov.ernment appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
·.appeals, which presented the common question whether
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol
4
The prosecution of Martinez-Fuerte was before a clifferent district judge than were the other cases.
5 11le principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be made
absent a warrant.

l'
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand.

B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north 'from the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente,
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that
the officers customarily stop all northbound motor"ists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached the vehicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming acrOSSJ
the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the
tevidence derived from the stop. The motion was de-
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that stops made without reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
\mconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Cl.rcuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, relying on 1,t s opinion in United States
v. Santibanez,'517 F. 2d 922 (1975,). There the Court
,. of Appeals ha.d ruled that routip:e checkpoint stops are
·consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm. 6
1'

.,

,.II ,'

. ..

., •.'

I· '

.

~·

(

The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the copstitutionality of a law
. enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turn. ing to the ·constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many years to limit
·immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
:the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
·countries of'"t)1e Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120;000 persons. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
"No. 89-236, § 21 (e), 79 Stat. 921. Many more aliens
·than can be accommodated under the quota want to live
and work in the United States. Consequently, large
'numbers of aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in
·the United States. We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of illegal immigrants [already] in
6 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1560, 423 U.S. 822, and later granted Sifuentes'
"petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in
tandem. 423 U. S. 945. Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to consolidate the cases for oral argument.
425 U.S.-,

r

.
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the United States vary widely. A conservative estima,te
in 1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 878 (1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of the illegal immigrants are from
Mexico, drawn by the fact that economic opportunities
are significantly greater in the United States than they
are in Mexico. United States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The prin, cipal problem arises from surreptitious entries. I d., at
405. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, ·electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United Sta,tes without detection. It also is
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by
'prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers
who transport them in private vehicles.. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879.
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize
7

The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued
to simplify passage between interrelated American and Mexican
communities along the border. These passes authorize travel within
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.6
(1976).
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Hlegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as
'those at San Clemente and Sarita, are maintained at
or near intersections of important roads leading away
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis
·designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations.
'Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 ( 1973) .8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
'Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United
:States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2.

B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of anumber of fa.ctors. The Border Patrol believes that to asAll these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1357 (a) ( 1), (a) (3).
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3)
may be exercised anywhere within 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR
§ 287.1 (a) (1976).
9
As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973). Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smugglers, many of whom are lawfully in the United States.
8

.

,,
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, ( ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
from the border, (iii) situated in terrain that restricts
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a
stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint. Approximately 10million cars pass the checkpoint
location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in
operation only about 70ro of the time. 10 In calendar
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed thr-ough the checkpoint
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondaFy inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have
resulted in an a.nnual total of over 33,000, although the
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there,
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as
every motorist is questioned.
10

The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages,
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads.
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III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
s~zure power·~ .in ;order to prevent arbitrary and oppres~ve interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal -secu~ipy of::in?.iyidpals. See United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895·; Camara v. kfunicipal Court, 387 U. S.
In delineating the constitu523, 528 ( 1967).
tional safeguaJ:ldS applicabl~ ,.in ,particular contexts, the
Court has weighed ·the publi~ interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
2_0-21 ( 1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so significantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
a search could be conducted without consent only if there
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warrant authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compare id., at 273, with id., at 283- 285 (PowELL,
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
appropriately are subject to less stringent constitutional
safeguards. The question was under what circumstances
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence
status. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment interests invol¥ed in such a stop was "modest," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a rovingpatrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. I d., at
884.11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning •of "the Fourth Amendment. The defendants contend primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalia because Brignoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends
in No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the advance judicial
authorization of a warrant. 'There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita.
As we reach the issue cif a warrant requirement only if
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests
at stake.
A
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
n On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was impermissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking.

f
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effectively at the border. We note here only the sub ...
stantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine
stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice
which the Government identifies as the most important
of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the United
States in No. 74-1560 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such high~ays would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend
many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the
fure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
f!fnited States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland
a:lways be based on reasonable suspicion would be
iinpractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
12 The defendants argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by
means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually
all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments
tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The
defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols noi defeated
by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra, at 13-14.
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of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though
smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.

B
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,
154 (1925), and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers
during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is
·a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the ·united States.'" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the ·vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
'be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspectionalso existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
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or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U. S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422> U. S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random
roving· patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use of the
llighways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol offieers. , . . [They] could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
0f the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by some officers in the fie,ld. Ibid.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public.. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists
using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The
regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
a class. And since field officers may stop only those cars

74-1560 & 75-5387:---:0PINION

J6

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or opera.t ing a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicif:l,l review.13
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusiveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those diverted and reducing
the assurances provided by equal treatment of all motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences.
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting
a routine and limited inquiry into residence status that
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the
'traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral
may involve some annoyance, but it remains true that
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover,
selective referrals--rather than questioning the occupants
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public.

c
The defendants note correctly that to accommodate
public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
13
The choice of checkpoint locations must be left largely to the
discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. See n. 15,
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operation also must be committed to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22-23.
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constitutional search or seizure. 14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 154.. In Camara the Court required an
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspect~
ing private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at
538. In so holding, the Court examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intrusions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that
under the circumstances the government interests outweighed those of the private citizen.
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here,
where we deal neither with searches nor with the
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar
matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated.. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles
briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility
and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use.
14
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sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See, e. g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence,
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 ( 1974) (plurality.
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures fol-.
lowed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal.
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the
.cases before us. Accordingly, we-hold that the stops and
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
. any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoin ts. 15
15 As a judicial warrant autbori:aed the Border Patrol to make rou• tine stops at · the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 741560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 5, S'f6pra. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. /d., at
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude tha.t no warrant is needed. But we deem
the argument by the defendants in No. 74-1560 in support of the
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San
Clemente.
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
-motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
1the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
'basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 6 we perceive no
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 15; cf. Camara v . .Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border Patrol to ass{lre effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of appresee supra, at 16 ; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538
hensions of the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens
use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was selected as
the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is lightest,
thereby minimizing interference with legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
1.s The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
. selectively stopping motorists. Brief for United States in No. 755387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
·whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legaUy resident
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the
}>opulation of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 75to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, of 16%,
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, val. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in
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constitutional violatil)n, Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved. 11

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant
requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent,
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code
inspection, even though the search could be conducted
absent cause to believe that there were violations in
the building searched.18
No. 74-1560, roughly 23,400 would be expected to contain persons
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to the
secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion that the
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area.
17 Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area dur. ing the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor ... ," although we held that
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885-887. Different
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian
border,
18 There also is some support for a wa.r rant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
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We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement in that context are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon
·privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to
which a warrant requirement here would make little contribution. The Court there said:
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
·of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
Other purposes served by the requirement of
a warrant also are inapplicable here. One such purStates, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting). The burden of these opinions, however,
was that an "area" warrant oould serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in AlmeidaSanchez is not an issue in these cases.
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 45·5-456 n. 22 (1976)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
The reasonableness of
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, factors that are not susceptible of the distortion of hindsight,
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer.
Unied States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297, 316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced
when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands
of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.

VI
In summary, we .hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. 19 'the principal protection of Fourth
1

~ MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new
intrusion on citizens'j rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post,
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 233, Congress
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance"
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The
;:lan Clemente checkpoint has been operating a.t or near its present
location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization,
tequiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra,
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief
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,Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra.
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ...
must be based on consent or probable eause." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
;judgment ofl'the ·Corti't of Appe~ls for the Fifth Circuit,
which had affil'med the conviction of Sifuentes. We reverse the ·judgmeht of the Coutt of Appeals for the Ninth
'Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of :Ma:rtinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
··lc'ases to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.

questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither
longstanding congressional autliorization nor widely prevailing practice justifies a constitutional violation. We do suggest, however,
that against this background and in the context of our recent
decisions, the rhetoric of the dissent reflects unjustified concern.
The dissenting opinion further warns:
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk ... ," Post,
at 6.
For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced.
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless
to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican
ancestry.

~~~
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 6 we perceive no
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 16; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens
regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was
selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is
lightest, thereby minimizing interference with ·legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 755387, 9; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legally resident
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the
population of Southern California, The 1970 census figures, which
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, or 16%,
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, vol. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio
is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in
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pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluatiOn
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure, Cf. United
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 455-456 n. 22 (1976)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
The reasonableness of
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, fa.ctors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight,
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297, 316--318 ( 1972). But the need· for·· this is reduced
when the decision to "seize" · is not entirely in the hands
·. of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops. for ·btief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be aut~orized by warrant. 19 ~he principal protec~io~ of Fourth
11l .).\1R •. JusTICE .BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted
concern . iri suggesting .. that to<iay's decision marks a radical new
intrusion on citizens' 'fights: It sp~aks of the "evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections," .. and · states t~at the Court "virtually
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post,
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June '21, 1952; 66 Stat. 233, Congress
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance"
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present
location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization,
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra,
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief
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1. The Border Patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a
permanent checkpoint located on a major highway away from
the Mexican border for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and the stops
and questioning may be made at reasonably located checkpoints
in the absence of any individualized suspicion that the particular
vehicle contains illegal aliens. Pp. 12-20.
(a) To require that such stops always be based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic
tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a
given car necessary to identify it as a possible carrier of illegal
aliens. Such a requirement also would largely eliminate any
deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations,
even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
Pp. 12-14.
(b) While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests
is quite limited, the interference with legitimate traffic being
minimal and checkpoint operations involving less discretionary
enforcement activity than roving-patrol stops. Pp. 14-16.
(c) Under the circumstances of these checkpoint stops, which
do not involve searches, the Government or public interest in
making such stops outweighs the constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen. Pp. 16-18.
(d) With respect to the checkpoint involved in No. 74--1560,
it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to a secondary
*Together with No. 75-5387, Sifuentes v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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inspection area for limited inquiry on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop, since the intrusion is
sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to
justify it. Pp. 19-20.
2. Operation of a fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in
advance by a judicial warrant. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U. S. 523, distinguished. The visible manifestations of the field
officers' authority at a checkpoint provide assurances to motorists
that the officers are acting lawfully. Moreover, the purpose of
a warrant in preventing hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure is inapplicable here,
since the reasonableness of checkpoint stops turns on factors such
as the checkpoint's location and method of operation. These
factors are not susceptible of the distortion of hindsight, and will
be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a
warrant. Nor is the purpose of a warrant in substituting a
magistrate's judgment for that of the searching or seizing officer
applicable, since the need for this is reduced when the decision
to "seize" is not entirely in the hands of the field officer and
deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher
ranking officials in selecting the checkpoint locations. Pp. 20-22.
No. 74-1560, 514 F. 2d 308, reversed and remanded; No. 75-5387,
affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER,
C. J., and S'l'EWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MAR·
SHALL, J., joined.

: This opinion ·Is subject to formal revision before publlcatlou
In tbe preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are 're•
quested to notify the Reporter of Decision s, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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0~ Writ. of Certiorari to
United States, Petitioner,
74-1560
v.
·
the Umted States Court
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'
'
the United States Court
. dv.S .
of Appeals for the Fifth
Umte
tates.
Circuit.
·
'[July 6, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses
relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens.
Each defendant was arrested at a permanent checkpoint
operated by the Border Patrol away from the international border with Mexico, and each sought the exclusiol)
of certain evidence on the ground that the operation of
the checkpoint was incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. In each instance whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated turns primarily on whether
a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no
reason to believe the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens. We reserved this question last Term in United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 897 n. 3 (1975). We hold
today that such stops are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. We also hold that the operation of a
fixed checkpoint need not be authorized in advance by
a judicial warrant .
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I
A
The respondents in No. 74-1560 are defendants in
three separate prosecutions resulting from arrests made
on three different occasions at the permanent immigration checkpoint on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Cal.
Interstate 5 is the principal highway between San Diego
&nd Los Angeles, and · the San Clemente checkpoint is
66 road miles north of the Mexican border. We previously have described the checkpoint as follows:
"'Approximately one mile south of the checkpoint
is a large black on yellow sign with flashing yellow
lights over the highway stating "ALL VEHICLES,
STOP AHEAD, 1 MILE." Three-quarters of a
mile further north are two black on yellow signs
suspended over the highway with flashing lights
stating "WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS." At the
checkpoint, which is also the location of a State of
California weighing station, are two large signs with
flashing red lights suspended over the highway.
These signs each state "STOP HERE-D. S. OFFICERS." Placed on the highway are a number
of orange traffic cones funneling traffic into two lanes
where a Border Patrol agent in full dress uniform,
standing behind a white on red "STOP" sign checks
traffic. Blocking traffic in the unused lanes are official U. S. Border Patrol vehicles with flashing red
lights. In addition, there is a permanent building
which houses the Border Patrol office and temporary
detention facilities. There are also floodlights for
nighttime operation.'"
United States v. Ortiz,
supra, at 893, quoting United States v. Baca, 368 F.
Supp. 398, 410- 411 (SD Cal. 1973).
The "point" agent standing between the two lanes of
traffic visually screens all northbound vehicles, which the
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checkpoint brings to a virtual, if not a complete, halt. 1
Most motorists are allowed to resume their progress without any oral inquiry or close visual examination. In a
relatively small number of cases the "point" agent will
conclude that further inquiry is in order. He directs
these cars to a secondary inspection area, where their occupants are asked about their citizenship and immigration status. The Government informs us that at San
Clemente the average length of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes. Brief
for United States 53. A direction to stop in the secondary inspection area could be based on something suspicious about a particular car passing through the checkpoint, but the Government concedes that none of the
three stops at issue in No. 74--1560 was based on any
articulable suspicion. During the period when these
stops were made, the checkpoint was opera.t ing under
a magistrate's "warrant of inspection," which authorized the Border Patrol to conduct a routine-stop
operation at the San Clemente location. 2
We turn now to the particulars of the stops involved
The parties disagree as to whether vehicles not referred to the
secondary inspection area are brought to a complete halt or merely
"roll" slowly through the checkpoint. Resolution of this dispute
is not necessary here, as we may assume, arguendo, that all motorists passing through the checkpoint are so slowed as to have been
"seized."
2 The
record does not reveal explicitly why a warrant was
sought. Shortly before the warrant application, however, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional a rou~
tine stop and search conducted at a permanent checkpoint without
'such a warrant. See United States v. Bowen, 500 F. 2d 960 (1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 422 U. S. 916 (1975); United States v.
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F. 2d 7 (1974). Soon after the warrant issued,
the Court of Appeals abo held unconstitutional routine checkpoint
stops conducted without a warrant. See United States v. Esquer..
Rivera, 500 F. 2d 313 (1974) . See also n. 151 infra.
1
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in No. 74-1560, and the procedural history of the
case. Respondent Amado Martinez-Fucrte approached
the checkpoint driving a vehicle containing two female passengers.
The women were illegal Mexican
aliens who entered the United States at the San Ysidro
port of entry by using false papers and rendezvoused
with Martinez-Fuerte in San Diego to be transported
northward. At the checkpoint their car was directed to
the secondary inspection area. Martinez-Fuerte produced documents showing him to be a lawful resident
alien, but his passengers admitted being present in the
country unlawfully. He was charged with two counts
of illegally transporting aliens in violation of 8 U. S. C.
§ 1324 (a) (2). He moved before trial to suppress all evidence stemming from the stop on the ground that the
operation of the checkpoint was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 3 The motion to suppress was denied, and he was convicted on both counts after a jury
trial.
Respondent Jose Jiminez-Garcia attempted to pass
through the checkpoint while driving a car containing
one passenger. He had picked the passenger up by prearrangement in San Ysidro after the latter had been
smuggled across the border. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed the illegal status of the
passenger, and Jiminez-Garcia was charged in two counts
with illegally transporting an alien, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a)
(2) , and conspiring to commit that offense. 18 U. S. C.
8
Each of the defendants in No. 74-1560 and the defendant in
No. 75-5387 sought to suppress, among other things, the testimony
of one or more illegal aliens. We noted in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 876 n. 2 (1975), that "[t]here may be
room to question whether voluntary testimony of a witness at trial,
as opposed to a Government agent's testimony about objects seized
or statements overheard, is subject to suppression . . . ." Thequestion again is not before us.
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§ 371. His motion to suppress the evidence derived
from the stop was granted.
Respondents Raymond Guillen and Fernando Medrano-Barragan approached the checkpoint with Guillen
driving and Medrano-Barragan and his wife as passengers. Questioning at the secondary inspection area revealed that Medrano-Barragan and his wife were illegal
aliens. A subsequent search of the car uncovered three
other illegal aliens in the trunk. Medrano-Barragan had
led the other aliens across the border at the beach near
Tijuana, Mexico, where they re11dezvoused with Guillen,
a United States citizen. Guillen and Medrano-Barragan
were jointly indicted on four counts of illegally transporting aliens, 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2), four counts of
inducing the illegal entry of aliens, id., §1324(a)(4),
and one conspiracy count. 18 U. S. C. § 371. The District Court granted the defendants' motion to suppress.
Martinez-Fuerte appealed his conviction, and the
Government appealed the granting of the motions to
suppress in the respective prosecutions of Jiminez-Garcia
and of Guillen and Medrano-Barragan. 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the three
appeals, which presented the common question whether
routine stops and interrogations at checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court of Appeals held, with one judge dissenting, that these stops
violated the Fourth Amendment, concluding that a stop
for inquiry is constitutional only if the Border Patrol
The prosecution of Martmez-Fuerte was before a different district judge than were the other cases.
5 The principal question before the Court of Appeals was the
constitutional significance of the "warrant of inspection" under
which the checkpoint was operating when the defendants were
stopped. See n. 15, infra. The Government, however, preserved
the question whether routine checkpoint stops could be mad~
absent a warrant ,
4
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reasonably suspects the presence of illegal aliens on the'
basis of articulable facts. It reversed Martinez-Fuerte's·
conviction, and affirmed the orders to suppress in the·
other cases. 514 F. 2d 308. We reverse and remand.

B
Petitioner in No. 75-5387, Rodolfo Sifuentes, was arrested at the permanent immigration checkpoint on U. S.
Highway 77 near Sarita, Tex. Highway 77 originates
in Brownsville, and it is one of the two major highways
running north from the lower Rio Grande valley. The
Sarita checkpoint is about 90 miles north of Brownsville, and 65-90 miles from the nearest point of the
Mexican border. The physical arrangement of the
checkpoint resembles generally that at San Clemente,
but the checkpoint is operated differently in that
the officers customarily stop all northbound motorists for a brief inquiry. Motorists whom the officers
recognize as local inhabitants, however, are waved
through the checkpoint without inquiry. Unlike the
San Clemente checkpoint the Sarita operation was conducted without a judicial warrant,.
Sifuentes drove up to the checkpoint without any
visible passengers. When an agent approached the ve-hicle, however, he observed four passengers, one in the
front seat and the other three in the rear, slumped down
in the seats. Questioning revealed that each passenger
was an illegal alien, although Sifuentes was a United
States citizen. The aliens had met Sifuentes in the
United States, by prearrangement, after swimming across
the Rio Grande.
Sifuentes was indicted on four counts of illegally
transporting aliens. 8 U. S. C. § 1324 (a) (2). He
moved on Fourth Amendment grounds to suppress the.evidence derived from the stop. The motion was de ....
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nied and he was convicted after a jury trial. Sifuentes
renewed his Fourth Amendment argument on appeal,
contending primarily that stops made without reason to believe a car is transporting aliens illegally are
unconstitutional. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, relying on its opinion in United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F. 2d 922 (1975). There the Court
of Appeals had ruled that routine checkpoint stops are
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We affirm. 6

II
The Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and the Fifth
Circuits are in conflict on the constitutionality of a law
enforcement technique considered important by those
charged with policing the Nation's borders. Before turning to the constitutional question, we examine the context in which it arises.
A
It has been national policy for many years to limit
immigration into the United States. Since July 1, 1968,
the annual quota for immigrants from all independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico,
has been 120,000 persons. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, §21 (e), 79 Stat. 921. Many more aliens
than can be accommodated under the quota want to live
and work in the United States. Consequently, large
numbers of aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in
the United States. We noted last Term that "[e]stimates of the number of illeg~l immigrants [already] in
0 We initially granted the Government's petition for a writ of
certiorari in No. 74-1.160, 423 U. S. 822, and later granted Sifuentes'
petition in No. 75-5387 and directed that the cases be argued in
tandem. 423 U. S. 945. Subsequently we granted the motion of
the Solicitor General to consQ]idate the cases for oral argument.
425 u.s.-.
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the United States vary widely. A conservative estimaw
in 1972 produced a figure of about one million, but the
Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally
in the country." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 878 (1975) (footnote omitted). It is estimated that 85% of the illegal immigrants are from
Mexico, drawn by the fact that economic opportunities
are significantly greater in the United States than they
are in Mexico. United States v. Baca, supra, at 402.
Interdicting the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico
poses formidable law enforcement problems. The principal problem arises from surreptitious entries. Id., at
405. The United States shares a border with Mexico that is almost 2,000 miles long, and much of the
border area is uninhabitated desert or thinly populated
arid land. Although the Border Patrol maintains personnel, ·electronic equipment, and fences along portions
of the border, it remains relatively easy for individuals
to enter the United States without detection. It also is
possible for an alien to enter unlawfully at a port of
entry by the use of falsified papers or to enter lawfully
but violate restrictions of entry in an effort to remain
in the country unlawfully. 7 Once within the country,
the aliens seek to travel inland to areas where employment is believed to be available, frequently meeting by
prearrangement with friends or professional smugglers
who transport them in private vehicles. United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 879.
The Border Patrol conducts three kinds of inland
traffic-checking operations in an effort to minimize
1

The latter occurs particularly where "border passes" are issued
to simplify passage bctwren interrelated American and Mexican
communities along the border. These passes authorize tra.vel within
25 miles of the border for a 72-hour period. See 8 CFR § 212.()
( 1976).
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illegal immigration. Permanent checkpoints, such as
those at San Clemente and Sarita, are ma.i ntained at
or near intersections of important roads leading away
from the border. They operate on a coordinated basis
designed to avoid circumvention by smugglers and
others who transport the illegal aliens. Temporary
checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones, occasionally are established in other strategic locations.
Finally, roving patrols are maintained to supplement the
checkpoint system. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 268 (1973). 8 In fiscal 1973, 175,511 deportable aliens were apprehended throughout the
Nation by "line watch" agents stationed at the border
itself. Traffic-checking operations in the interior apprehended approximately 55,300 more deportable aliens. 9
Most of the traffic-checking apprehensions were at checkpoints, though precise figures are not available. United
States v. Baca, supra, at 405, 407 and n. 2.

B
We are concerned here with permanent checkpoints,
the locations of which are chosen on the basis of a number of factors. The Border Patrol believes that to as8 All these operations are conducted pursuant to statutory authorizations empowering Border Patrol agents to interrogate those believed to be aliens as to their right to be in the United States and
to inspect vehicles for aliens. 8 U S. C. §§ 1357 (a) (1) , (a) (3).
Under current regulations the authority conferred by § 1357 (a) (3)
may be exercised anywhere w1thin 100 miles of the border. 8 CFR
§ 287.1 (a) (1976) .
9
As used in these statistics, the term "deportable alien" means "a
person who has been found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, or who admits his deportability upon questioning by official
agents." United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 404 (SD Cal.
1973) . Most illegal aliens are simply deported without prosecution.
The Government routinely prosecutes persons thought to be smug-·
·@jet:S, many o.f whQm are lawfully m the United States.
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sure effectiveness, a checkpoint must be (i) distant
enough from the border to avoid interference with traffic
in populated areas near the border, ( ii) close to the
confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
ftom the border, (iii)1 situated' in terrain that restricts
vehicle passage around the checkpoint, (iv) on a
stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and
(v) beyond the 25-mile zone in which "border passes,"
see n. 7, supra, are valid. United States v. Baca, supra,
at 406.
The record in No. 74-1560 provides a rather complete
picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint. Approximately 10 million cars pass the checkpoint
location each year, although the checkpoint actually is in
operation only about 70o/o of the time. 10 In calendar
year 1973, approximately 17,000 illegal aliens were
apprehended there. During an eight-day period in 1974
that included the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 146,000 vehicles passed through the checkpoint
during 124Ys hours of operation. Of these, 820 vehicles
were referred to the secondary inspection area, where
Border Patrol agents found 725 deportable aliens in 171
vehicles. In all but two cases, the aliens were discovered
without a conventional search of the vehicle. A similar
rate of apprehensions throughout the year would have
resulted in an annual total of over 33,000, although the
Government contends that many illegal aliens pass
through the checkpoint undetected. The record in
No. 75-5387 does not provide comparable statistical
information regarding the Sarita checkpoint. While it
appears that fewer illegal aliens are apprehended there,
it may be assumed that fewer pass by undetected, as
every motorist is questioned.
The Sarita checkpoint is operated a comparable proportion of
the time. "Down" periods are caused by personnel shortages,
weather conditions, and-at San Clemente-peak traffic loads.
10
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III
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search and
seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals. See United State$
v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878; United States v. Ortiz,
422 U. S., at 895-; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523, 528 ( 1967). In delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the
Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual, United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-21 (1968), a process evident in our previous cases
dealing with Border Patrol traffic-checking operations.
In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, the question was whether a roving-patrol unit constitutionally
could search a vehicle for illegal aliens simply because it
was in the general vicinity of the border. We recognized
that important law enforcement interests were at stake
but held that searches by roving patrols impinged so sig-:nificantly on Fourth Amendment privacy interests that
a search could be conducted without consent only if there·
was probable cause to believe that a car contained illegal
aliens, at least in the absence of a judicial warmnt authorizing random searches by roving patrols in a given
area. Compa.re id., at 273, with id., at 283~285 (PowELL,
J., concurring), and id., at 288 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
We held in United States v. Ortiz, supra, that the same
limitations applied to vehicle searches conducted at a
permanent checkpoint.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, however,
we recognized that other traffic-checking practices involve
a different balance of public and private interests and
appropriately a.re subject to less stringent constitutional
&afeguarqs. The questio.n was under what circumstance~

..
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a roving patrol could stop motorists in the general area.
of the border for brief inquiry into their residence
status. We found that the interference with Fourth
Amendment interests involv·ed in such a stop was "modest," id., at 880, while the inquiry served significant law
enforcement needs. We therefore held that a roving·
patrol stop need not be justified by probable cause and
may be undertaken if the stopping officer is "aware of
specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a vehicle contains illegal aliens. ld., at
884.11

IV
It is agreed that checkpoint stops are 11 seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The defend..
ants contend primarily that the routine stopping of vehicles at a checkpoint is invalid because Brignoni-Ponce
must be read as proscribing any stops in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, Sifuentes alternatively contends
ih No. 75-5387 that routine checkpoint stops are permissible only when the practice has the advance judicial
authorization of a warrant. There was a warrant authorizing the stops at San Clemente but none at Sarita.
As we reach the issue of a warrant requirement only if
reasonable suspicion is not required, we turn first to
whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid
stop, a question to be resolved by balancing the interests
at stake.
A
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance
of a traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary
because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled
11 On the facts of the case, we concluded that the stop was i.m..
permissible because reasonable suspicion was lacking.
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effectively at the border. We note here only the sub·
stantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine
stops for inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice
which the Government identifies as the most important
of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for the United
States in No. 74-1560 19-20. 12 These checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into
the interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend
many smugglers and illegal aliens who succumb to the
lure of such highways. And the prospect of such inquiries
forces others onto less efficient roads that are less heavily
travelled, slowing their movement and making them
more vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 883-885-.
A requirement that stops on major routes inland
always be based on reasonable suspicion would be
impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too
heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in
maintaining checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by
means other than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they
suggest legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal
aliens. The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually
all search and seizure powers. In any event, these arguments
tend to go to the general proposition that all traffic-checking procedures are impermissible, a premise our previous cases reject. The
defendants' do not suggest persuasively that the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance ·
on routine checkpoint stops. Compare United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S., at 883 (effectiveness of roving patrols not defeated
by reasonable suspicion requirement), with infra, at 13-14.
12

14-1560 & 75-5387-0PINION

l4

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

of well-disguised smuggling operations, even though
smugglers are known to . use these highways regularly.

B
While the need to make routine checkpoint stops is
great, the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment
interests is quite limited. The stop does intrude to a
limited extent on motorists' right to "free passage without interruption," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,
154 ( 1925), and arguably on their right to personal security. But it involves only a brief detention of travelers
during which
"'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is
a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to
be in the United States.'" United States v. Brig. noni-Ponce, supra, at 880.
Neither the vehicle nor its occupants is searched, and
visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can
be seen without a search. This objective intrusion-the
stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspectionalso existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective
intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the
case of a checkpoint stop. In Ortiz, we noted that
"the circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop
and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often
operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers'
authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened
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or annoyed by the intrusion.' 1 422 U. S., at
894-895.
In Brignoni-Ponce, we recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis in this context also must take into account
the overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic.
422 U.S., at 882-883. We concluded there that random
roving-patrol stops could not be tolerated because they
"would subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to
potentially unlimited interference with their use ,of the
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. • . . [They] could stop motorists at random for
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles
of the 2,000 mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road . . . ." Ibid. There also
was a grave danger that such unreviewable discretion
would be abused by some officers in the field. Ibid.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly
on the motoring public. First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists
using these high ways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second,
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement activity. The,
regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to lawabiding motorists, that the stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen
by officers in the field, but by officials responsiple for
making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume
that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as
a cl~. And since field officers may stop only those cars

.
'
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passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or
harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case
of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or opera.ting a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judi~
cial review. 13
The defendants arrested at the San Clemente checkpoint suggest that its operation involves a significant
extra element of intrusfveness in that only a small percentage of cars are referred to the secondary inspection
area, thereby "stigmatizing" those diverted and reducing
the assurances provided by equal treatment of aU motorists. We think defendants overstate the consequences.
Referrals are made for the sole purpose of conducting
a routine and limited. inquiry into residence status that
cannot feasibly be made of every motorist where the
traffic is heavy. The objective intrusion of the stop
and inquiry thus remains minimal. Selective referral
may involve some annoyance, but it r·emains true that
the stops should not be frightening or offensive because
of their public and relatively routine nature. Moreover,
selective referrals-rather than questioning the occupants
of every car-tend to advance some Fourth Amendment
interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public.

c

The defendants note correctly that to accommodate
public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a
13
The choice of checkpoint locations must be left la.rgely to the
discretion of Border Patrol officials, to be exercised in accordance
with statutes and regulations that may be applicable. Se~ n. 15,
infra. Many incidents of checkpoint operation also must be com•
mitted to the discretion of such officials. But see infra, at 22-23.
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constitutional search or seizure.14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S., at 21, and n. 18. But the Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.
This is clear from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
supra, at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring); id., at 288
(WHITE, J., dissenting); Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 154. In Camara the Court required an
"area" warrant to support the reasonableness of inspecting private residences within a particular area for building code violations, but recognized that "specific knowledge of the conditions of the particular dwelling" was
not required to enter any given residence. 387 U. S., at
538. In so holding, the Court examined the government interests advanced to justify such routine intru- ·
sions "upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," id., at 534-535, and concluded that
under the circumstances the government interests outweighed those of the private citizen.
We think the same conclusion is appropriate here,
where we deal neither with searches nor with the
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar from those involved here,
are used widely at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding·
drivers' licenses, safety requirements, weight limits, and similar·
matters. The bet that the purpose of such laws is &'tid to be
administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel, and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued, might prevent enforcement officials
from stopping motorists for questioning on these matters in the·
absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being violated. As
such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other tf1an to note that this practice of stopping automobiles
briefly· for questioning· has a long history evidencing its utilityand. is accepted. by mPtoJrist.s as incident to highway use.
14

•.
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sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded
the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.
See, e. (]., McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S.
451 (1948). As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its
operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S., at 896 n. 2; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590-591 (1974) (plurality
opinion). And the reasonableness of the procedures followed in making these checkpoint stops makes the resulting intrusion on the interests of motorists minimal.
On the other hand, the purpose of the stops is legitimate
and in the public interest, and the need for this enforcement technique is demonstrated by the records in the
cases before us. Accordingly, we hold that the stops and
questioning at issue may be made in the absence of
any individualized suspicion at reasonably located
checkpoints.15
1
~ As a judicial warrant authorized the Border Patrol to make routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, the principal question
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 741560 was whether routine checkpoint stops were constitutional when
authorized by warrant. Cf. n. 5, supra. The Court of Appeals held
alternatively that a warrant never could authorize such stops, 514
F. 2d, at 318, and that it was unreasonable to issue a warrant
authorizing routine stops at the San Clemente location. Id., at
321-322. In reaching the latter conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on (i) "the [low] frequency with which illegal aliens
pass through the San Clemente checkpoint," (ii) the distance of
the checkpoint from the border, and (iii) the interference with
legitimate traffic. Ibid. We need not address these holdings specifically, as we conclude that no warrant is needed. But we deem
the argument by the defendants in No . 74-1560 in support of the
latter holding to raise the question whether, even though a warrant
is not required, it is unreasonable to locate a checkpoint at San,
Clemente.

. I.
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We further believe that it is constitutional to refer
motorists selectively to the secondary inspection area at
the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis of criteria that
would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if
it be assumed that such referrals are made largely on the
basis of apparent Mexican ancestry/ 6 we perceive no
We answer this question in the negative. As indicated above,
the choice of checkpoint locations is an administrative decision
that must be left largely within the discretion of the Border Patrol,
see supra, at 16; cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538
(1967). We think the decision to locate a checkpoint at San Clemente was reasonable. The location meets the criteria prescribed
by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness, see supra, at 9-10, and
the evidence supports the view that the needs of law enforcement
are furthered by this location. The absolute number of apprehensions at the checkpoint is high, see supra, at 10, confirming
Border Patrol judgment that significant numbers of illegal aliens
regularly use Interstate 5 at this point. Also, San Clemente was
selected as the location where San Diego-to-Los Angeles traffic is
lightest, thereby minimizing interference with legitimate traffic.
No question has been raised about the reasonableness of the
location of the Sarita checkpoint.
16 The Government suggests that trained Border Patrol agents
rely on factors in addition to apparent Mexican ancestry when
selectively diverting motorists. Brief for United States in No. 755387, 9; see United 'States v. Brignoni-Ppnce, 422 U.S., at 884-885.
This assertion finds support in the record. Less than 1% of the
motorists passing the checkpoint are stopped for questioning,
whereas American citizens of Mexican ancestry and legaHy resident
Mexican citizens constitute a significantly larger proportion of the
population of Southern California. The 1970 census figures, which
may not fully reflect illegal aliens, show the population of California
to be approximately 19,958,000 of whom some 3,102,000, or 16% 1
are Spanish speaking or of Spanish surname. The equivalent percentages for metropolitan San Diego and Los Angeles are 13% and
18% respectively. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, val. 1, pt. 6, Tables 48, 140. If the statewide population ratio
Is applied to the approximately 146,000 vehicles passing through
the checkpoint during the eight days surrounding the arrests in
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constitutional violation. Cf. United States v. BrignoniPonce, supra, at 885-887. As the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist
to justify it, we think it follows that the Border Patrol
officers must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted for the brief questioning involved. 17

v
Sifuentes' alternative argument is that routine stops
at a checkpoint are permissible only if a warrant has
given judicial authorization to the particular checkpoint
location and the practice of routine stops. A warrant
requirement in these circumstances draws some support
from Camara, where the Court held that, absent consent,
an "area" warrant was required to make a building code
inspection, even though the search could be conducted
absent cause to believe that there were violations in
the building searched.18
No. 74-1560, roughly 23,400 would be expected to contain persons
of Spanish or Mexican ancestry, yet only 820 were referred to the
secondary area. This appears to refute any suggestion that the
Border Patrol relies extensively on apparent Mexican ancestry
standing alone in referring motorists to the secondary area.
17 Of the 820 vehicles referred to the secondary inspection area during the eight days surrounding the arrests involved in No. 74-1560,
roughly 20% contained illegal aliens. Supra, at 10. Thus, to the extent
that the Border Patrol relies on apparent Mexican ancestry at this
checkpoint, see n. 16, supra, that reliance clearly is relevant to the law
enforcement need to be served. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 887, where we noted that "[t]he likelihood that any given
person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . ," although we held that
apparent Mexican ancestry by itself could not create the reasonable
suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop. !d., at 885~887. Different
considerations would arise if, for example, reliance were put on apparent Mexican ancestry at a checkpoint operated near the Canadian
border,
18 There also is some support for a warrant requirement in the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
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We do not think, however, that Camara is an apt
model. It involved the search of private residences, for
which a warrant traditionally has been required. See,
e. g., McDonald v. United States, supra. As developed
more fully above, the strong Fourth Amendment interests that justify the warrant requirement in that context are absent here. The degree of intrusion upon
privacy that may be occasioned by a search of a house
hardly can be compared with the minor interference with
privacy resulting from the mere stop for questioning as
to residence. Moreover, the warrant requirement in
Camara served specific Fourth Amendment interests to
which a warrant requirement here would make little contribution. The Court there said :
"[W]hen [an] inspector [without a warrant] demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power
to search, and no way of knowing whether 't he inspector himself is acting under proper authorization." 387 U. S., at 532.
A warrant provided assurance to the occupant on these
scores. We believe that the visible manifestations of
the field officers' authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case.
Other purposes served by the requirement of
a warrant also ar·e inapplicable here. One such purStates, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), which commanded the votes of five
Justices. See id., at 283-285 (PowELL, J., concurring) ; id ., at 288
(WHITE, J ., dissenting) . The burden of these opinions, however,
was that an "area" warrant could serve as a substitute for the individualized probable cause to search that otherwise was necessary
to sustain roving-patrol searches. As particularized suspicion is
not necessary here, the warrant function discussed in AlmeidaSanchez is not an issue in these cases.

74-1560 & 75--5387-0PINION

UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE

22

pose is to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation
of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Cf. United
States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 455-456 n. 22 (1976)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
The reasonableness of
checkpoint stops, however, turns on factors such as the
location and method of operation of the checkpoint, fac ..
tors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight,
and therefore will be open to post-stop review notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. Another purpose for
a warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of
the magistrate for that of the searching or seizing officer.
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S.
297, 316-318 (1972). But the need for this is reduced
when the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the hands
of the officer in the field, and deference is to be given to
the administrative decisions of higher ranking officials.

VI
In summary, we hold that stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be authorized by warrant. 19 The principal protection of Fourth
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion reflects unwarranted
concern in suggesting that today's decision marks a radical new
intrusion on citizens' rights: It speaks of the "evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections," and states that the Court "virtually
empties the Amendment of its reasonableness requirement." Post,
at 1, 2. Since 1952, Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 233, Congress
has expressly authorized persons believed to be aliens to be interrogated as to residence and vehicles "within a reasonable distance"· .
from the border to be searched for aliens. See n. 8, supra. The
San Clemente checkpoint has been operating at or near its present
location throughout the intervening 24 years. Our prior cases have
limited significantly the reach of this congressional authorization,
requiring probable cause for any vehicle search in the interior and
reasonable suspicion for inquiry stops by roving patrols. See supra,
at 11-12. Our holding today, approving routine stops for brief
19
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Amendment rights at checkpoints lies in appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S., at 24--27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
s:upra, at 881-882. We have held that checkpoint
searches are constitutional only if justified by consent or
probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, supra.
And our holding today is limited to the type of stops
described in this opinion. "[A]ny further detention ...
must be based on consent or probable cause." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. None of the defendants in these cases argues that the stopping officers
exceeded these limitations. Consequently, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which had affirmed the conviction of Sifuentes. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit and remand the case with directions to affirm the
conviction of Martinez-Fuerte and to remand the other
~ases to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.

·questioning (a type of stop familiar to all motorists) is confined to
permanent checkpoints. We understand, of course, that neither
longstanding congressional authorization nor widely prevailing practice justifies a constitutional violation. We do suggest, however,
that against this background and in the context of our recent
decisions, the rhetoric of the dissent reflects unjustified concern.
The dissenting opinion further warns:
"Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican
alien lawfully in this country must know after today's decision that
he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at [his] risk ... ," Post,
at 6.
For the reason stated in n. 16, supra, this concern is misplaced.
Moreover, upon a proper showing, courts would not be powerless
to prevent the misuse of checkpoints to harass those of Mexican
:ancestry.

